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FRACKING AND FEDERALISM: SUPPORT 
FOR AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH THAT 
AVOIDS THE TRAGEDY OF THE 
REGULATORY COMMONS 
Emily C. Powers* 
INTRODUCTION 
New York State is currently engaged in the process of crafting 
a regime to regulate a controversial gas extraction technique called 
hydrofracking.1 The breadth and scale of hydrofracking’s potential 
impacts present state and local officials with novel and uncertain 
environmental and regulatory challenges. These challenges provide 
a unique opportunity to test some of the assumptions underlying 
academic discussions of environmental federalism.2  
Congress exempted hydrofracking and its roughly thirty 
affiliated and component processes3 from key portions of federal 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2012; M.L.A., Cornell University, 
2007. I extend many thanks to Professor Gregg P. Macey for his invaluable 
guidance, insight, and support; to the staff and Executive Board of the Journal 
of Law & Policy; and to Pamela Hamilton for her excellent copyediting. I also 
thank Dick Le Count, Director, Emergency Management Office, Tioga County, 
NY; Andrew Fagan, Director, Cornell Cooperative Extension for Chemung and 
Tioga Counties, NY; Rod Howe, Cornell Community and Regional 
Development Institute; Elaine Jardine, Director of Planning, Tioga County, NY; 
David Kay, Cornell Community and Regional Development Institute; Judith 
Quigley, County Attorney, Tioga County, NY; Wendy Walsh, Director, Soil and 
Water Conservation District, Tioga County, NY. 
1 See infra Part I. 
2 See Marcellus Shale, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2011) (providing 
overview of hydrofracking in New York and the State’s regulatory strategy). 
3 See 3D Rig Animation, ENERGY IN DEPTH, http://www.energyindepth. 
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environmental laws,4 leaving regulation largely to the States. As a 
result, policymakers in gas-rich states like New York are under 
unusually high pressure to make difficult trade-offs between 
significant economic benefits and uncertain harms to public health 
and the environment, some of them potentially catastrophic and 
long lasting.5 The difficult choices hydrofracking poses and the 
nature of its potential harms illustrate the character of federalism 
concerns within the context of environmental problems.6  
Although New York generally permits local governments to 
regulate local activities,7 it is hardly surprising that in such a high-
                                                          
org/rig/index.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2011) (animated video provides three 
dimensional tour of a wellpad and hydrofracking operations). 
4 See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 
21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 251 n.125 (2010) (listing and explaining exceptions).  
See also Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594, 694 
(2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections throughout the U.S. Code) 
(exempting hydraulic fracturing processes from the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 300(h)(d) (West 2010)). The Energy Policy Act also altered how 
portions of the following Acts are applied to hydrofracking, resulting in de facto 
exemption: Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability 
Act (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601–75 (West 2010)); Clean Water Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 
(1948) (codified in scattered sections throughout 33 U.S.C.); National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321–4347 (West 2010)); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et. seq. (West 2010)); Clean Air Act (CAA), ch. 360, 69 
Stat. 322 (1955) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671 (West 2010)); 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified in scattered sections throughout 42 
U.S.C.); 40 C.F.R. §§ 372.22(b), 373.23(b). See CITIZENS CAMPAIGN FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT, PROTECTING NEW YORK’S AIR, LAND, WATER AND PEOPLE: 
WHAT’S THE HYDRO-FRACKING RUSH? 12 (last visited Feb. 4, 2010), available 
at http://www.citizenscampaign.org/PDFs/cce_hvhf_wp_final.pdf [hereinafter 
WHAT’S THE HYDRO-FRACKING RUSH?]. See Michael G. Gibson & David P. 
Young, Oil and Gas Exemptions Under RCRA and CERCLA: Are They Still 
“Safe Harbors” Eleven Years Later?, 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 361 (1991), for a dated 
but thorough analysis of oil and gas exemptions under RCRA and CERCLA. 
5 See infra Part I.C. 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 1 et. seq. (McKinney 2010). 
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stakes atmosphere the State has removed almost all regulatory 
authority from municipalities.8 This contraction of regulatory 
authority may lead to suboptimal results. On the one hand, strict 
state primacy with diminished local input threatens to result in 
inadequate environmental protection.9 On the other hand, concerns 
about the adequacy of New York’s proposed regulatory regime 
have led to sharp and vocal criticism of hydrofracking in general, 
which has in turn generated intense public opposition to the 
practice.10 This opposition itself threatens to curtail gas 
production.11 New York’s regulatory primacy could lead to both 
underprotection and underdevelopment of natural gas resources as 
public and political fears dominate regulators’ decision making 
processes.12 
The daunting task of addressing complex policy problems, like 
hydrofracking, has driven academic debate over how federal, state, 
and local governments can interact within our federalist system to 
most effectively protect environmental quality without unduly 
sacrificing economic growth.13 Legal scholars drawing from 
economics and political science make efficiency-maximizing 
arguments based on assumptions about the way markets and 
                                                          
8 Note that this restriction of local authority is not unique to hydrofracking, 
and has long been applied to oil and gas extraction in the state. See N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION LAW § 23-0303 (McKinney 2010). 
9 See infra Parts III–IV. 
10 See, e.g., Cuomo Gets an Earful About Hydrofracking, CHANNEL 9 NEWS 
(Aug. 19, 2010, 6:13 PM), http://www.9wsyr.com/news/local/story/Cuomo-
gets-an-earful-about-hydrofracking/5yuto95T5kuIfnUE0ejQHw.cspx; Mireya 
Navarro, State Decision Blocks Drilling for Gas in Catskills, N.Y. TIMES, April 
23, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/science/ 
earth/24drill.html?scp=3&sq=hydrofracking%20opponents%20city%20council
%20meeting&st=cse; Hydrofracking Opponent Disrupts Cuomo Speech, 
CAPITAL TONIGHT (Feb. 3, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www.capitaltonight.com/ 
2011/02/hydrofracking-opponent-disrupts-cuomo-speech/; Josh Garrett, 
Opponents Outnumber Supporters at NYC Hydrofracking Meeting, 
HEATINGOIL.COM (Aug. 25, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.heatingoil.com/blog/ 
opponents-outnumber-supporters-at-nyc-hydrofracking-meeting825/. 
11 See supra note 10; infra Part IV. 
12 See infra Parts III–IV. 
13 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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rational actors function.14 However, recent theories take a cue from 
ecology and attempt to describe the dynamic interplay among the 
levels of government.15 These theories apply observations about 
structural federalism in order to craft flexible frameworks for 
generating policy responses to environmental problems.  
Two relatively new approaches, “adaptive federalism,”16 and 
“the regulatory commons,”17 counter the efficiency-focused 
approaches to environmental protection. Each approach highlights 
how a limited focus on matching environmental problems with the 
“right” tier of government is likely to lead to underprotection.18 
Adaptive federalism advocates for flexible roles for the three levels 
of government, based on the observation that overlapping 
jurisdiction provides a system of vertical checks and balances.19 
The regulatory commons analysis outlines how confusion over 
                                                          
14 See infra Part II.B.1. 
15 See infra Part II.B.2. 
16 See generally David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive 
Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008) [hereinafter Adaptive Federalism]; see 
also William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005) [hereinafter Contextual Environmental Federalism] 
(articulating a similar discussion about the salience of a robust federalism with 
overlapping regulatory roles). 
17 William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Recognizing the 
Regulatory Commons]. Buzbee has expounded upon the mechanisms at work in 
the regulatory commons in several articles since. See, e.g., Contextual 
Environmental Federalism, supra note 16; William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical 
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1547 (2007) [hereinafter Asymmetrical Regulation]. 
18 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching 
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996). 
19 See generally Adaptive Federalism, supra note 16. The “checks and 
balances” discussion was developed more fully by Engel in an earlier article. 
See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 179 (2006) [hereinafter Harnessing the 
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism]. Similarly, Buzbee’s discussion of contextual 
environmental federalism challenges matching arguments that presume state 
primacy is preferable to a robust, three-tiered scheme. See Contextual 
Environmental Federalism, supra note 16. 
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jurisdictional boundaries can lead to gaps in protection even where 
an apparently vigorous overlapping regulatory scheme is in 
place.20 Together, these approaches provide a hopeful perspective 
on the future of environmental federalism while remaining realistic 
about how protective goals can be frustrated.21 
This Note asserts that the kinds of challenges hydrofracking 
presents, as well as its current regulatory status, lend support to 
theories that advocate for an adaptive approach to federalism. In 
forming its conclusions, this Note draws heavily on the 
experiences of some county-level officials in New York State,22 
which illustrate the kinds of pressures localities face and the 
compromises they are compelled to make in the high stakes 
atmosphere surrounding hydrofracking. These officials’ accounts 
and New York’s overall experience suggest that not only is 
underprotection likely when complex policy choices are left solely 
to the States, but that federal regulatory involvement can prevent 
the development of market inefficiencies that arise when massive 
uncertainty over environmental impacts stimulates popular 
opposition to a new technology.  
In Part I, this Note describes what hydrofracking is, and lays 
out its harms and history. Part II introduces the relevant 
approaches to environmental federalism and some of their 
weaknesses. Part III explains the existing regulatory framework for 
hydrofracking, presents the approaches some officials in gas-rich 
Tioga County, NY23 take as they prepare for the commencement of 
                                                          
20 See Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 17. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 County-level officials were selected for their capacity to communicate 
both detail and generality about how a number of towns and villages are dealing 
with the same or similar sets of issues.  
23 Tioga County was chosen as a focal point for this Note during 
discussions with David Kay at the Community and Regional Development 
Institute at Cornell University (CARDI), whom I contacted because CARDI has 
been actively involved in trying to help central New York communities prepare 
for hydrofracking. Tioga County’s geologic features and proximity to the 
Millennium Pipeline make it particularly amenable to hydrofracking, thus a lot 
of activity is likely to occur there. In addition, as a primarily rural area, Tioga 
County shares landscape and political similarity with other counties likely to 
experience hydrofracking activity, thus is fairly representative of the kinds of 
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a high level of hydrofracking activity, and describes their 
perspectives on the sufficiency of the available regulatory tools. 
Part IV considers the policy implications of these officials’ and 
New York State’s experience with hydrofracking within the 
discussion of environmental federalism. Part IV also describes how 
the State’s experience provides insight into incentive structures 
that result in regulatory commons problems. This Note concludes 
by asserting that a conception of federalism that includes all three 
levels of authority—local, state, and federal—is more likely to 
forestall commons problems than reliance on strict state primacy. 
I. THE HIGH STAKES OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN NEW YORK 
STATE 
Recent interest in developing energy alternatives to oil, and 
advancements in natural gas extraction technologies, have led to 
controversy over the proper way to regulate a drilling and 
production process called hydrofracking.24 The potential harms 
from hydrofracking are serious, and some would be irreversible.25 
At the same time, the economic benefits to be derived from 
hydrofracking are substantial.26 Thus, public debate has focused on 
                                                          
issues that will be faced throughout the state. After identifying Tioga County as 
a good subject area for study, I contacted Andrew Fagan at the Cornell 
Cooperative Extension for Tioga and Chemung Counties, also a member of 
Tioga County Investigates Natural Gas, a working group formed in order to 
anticipate hydrofracking issues, who helped me identify and select other 
officials whose duties are likely to be significantly implicated by hydrofracking.  
I visited Owego, NY, in October of 2010 in order to conduct interviews with 
Andrew Fagan and Elaine Jardine, Director of Planning for Tioga County. 
Jardine suggested I contact Dick Le Count, Director of Emergency 
Management, and Judith Quigley, County Attorney. Interviews with Wendy 
Walsh, Director of the Soil and Water Conservation District, Le Count, and 
Quigley were conducted by telephone. During the interviews, I asked the 
officials to describe their experiences with preparing for hydrofracking, the 
kinds of concerns they have, how they are addressing these concerns, and how 
they feel their responsibilities are impacted by the current and proposed 
regulatory scheme. 
24 See infra Part I.A. 
25 See infra Part I.C. 
26 See infra Part I.C. 
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the value, safety, and wisdom of allowing hydrofracking, and has 
divided many communities along economic lines.27 
A. Hydraulic Fracturing: Description and Background 
Hydrofracking is a term derived from the name of a gas drilling 
and extraction process called hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic 
fracturing involves the injection of fluid into a well to cause 
subsurface formations to fracture and release natural gas.28 First 
developed in the 1940s, hydraulic fracturing has been used 
throughout the country for about sixty years and in New York 
State since the 1950s.29 Beginning in the 1990s, the oil and gas 
industry began to use hydraulic fracturing in horizontal wells—so 
called because they are drilled on an angle to run horizontally 
within target formations below the earth’s surface.30 The first 
horizontal well in the East was drilled in Pennsylvania in 2003 to 
reach the gas-rich Marcellus shale formation, which underlies 
much of the Appalachian region.31 At present, “hydrofracking” is a 
term generically used to refer to a process that employs hydraulic 
fracturing, horizontal drilling, and high-volume fluid injection.32  
Hydrofracking is an intensive industrial activity that involves 
significant environmental disturbance.33 First, an access road is 
                                                          
27 See infra Part I.C. 
28 Marcellus Shale, supra note 2. 
29 N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL 
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND 
SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 5–32 (2009) [hereinafter SGEIS]. 
30 Marianne Lavelle, Forcing Gas Out of Rock With Water, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (Oct. 17, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 
news/2010/10/101022-energy-marcellus-shale-gas-science-technology-water/. 
31 John A. Harper, The Marcellus Shale: A “New” Old Gas Reservoir in 
Pennsylvania, 38 PENN. GEOLOGY, no. 1, 2008 at 9, available at http://www. 
dcnr.state.pa.us/topogeo/pub/pageolmag/pdfs/v38n1.pdf. 
32 See, e.g., David W. Chen & Javier C. Hernandez, Checking the 
Statements in the Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, at 24, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/nyregion/19facts.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=hydrofr
acking&st=cse (defining hydrofracking as “the process of using high-pressure 
water to extract natural gas from rock formations”). 
33 SGEIS, supra note 29, at ch. 5. 
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built, after which a two- to five-acre site is cleared and prepared 
for drilling and pumping operations, and a drilling rig and other 
storage and processing structures are installed.34 Next, a well is 
drilled deep into bedrock, and acid is injected to clean the resulting 
“wellbore.”35 The wellbore is then fitted with a steel and concrete 
casing, which is perforated within the profile of the target 
formation to allow fluid to enter and break it up.36 Next, millions 
of gallons of water are trucked to the wellpad,37 where it is then 
mixed with chemical agents with anti-corrosive and anti-bacterial 
functions, many of which are highly toxic.38 In addition, materials 
like sand, which prop open fractures, and emulsifiers are added to 
the mix.39 The resulting mixture, or fracking fluid, is pumped into 
the wellbore at high pressure.40 The fluid fractures the target 
formation and escaping gas flows out of the wellbore to gathering 
lines, which carry it to larger pipelines. An estimated 9 to 35 
percent of the fracking, or “flowback,” fluid flows back up the 
wellbore over a period of about two weeks.41 The rest remains 
below the earth’s surface and has the potential to move through 
cracks in well casings or the target substrate into surrounding rock 
and eventually to migrate into and contaminate groundwater 
sources for waterways and drinking supplies.42  
                                                          
34 Id. at 5-5 to -12. 
35 Id. at 5-93. More than one well will often be drilled on a single wellpad. 
Id. at 5-20. 
36 See 3D Rig Animation, supra note 3. SGEIS, supra note 29, at 5-91, 5-
93. 
37 The DEC has estimated that each frack job will require 400–600 tanker 
trucks of water. SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-137. 
38 See Hydraulic Fracturing 101, EARTHWORKS ACTION, http://www.earth 
worksaction.org/FracingDetails.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); see also 
SGEIS, supra note 29, at 5-32. 
39 See Marcellus Shale, supra note 2.  
40 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 5-92 to -94; Oilfield Glossary: Hydraulic 
Fracturing, SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY, http://www.glossary.oilfield. 
slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=hydraulic%20fracturing (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
41 See also SGEIS, supra note 29, at 5-97. 
42 Id. at 6-37. DEC considers this a low probability, considering that fluid 
will be injected into the dense shale layer thousands of feet below water supply 
aquifers, thus treats leaks that occur during drilling or from surface spills as 
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The combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
presents concerns because it greatly increases the extent of drilling 
and the quantity of fracking fluid required.43 Wellbores can extend 
as far down as 12,000 feet,44 and can radiate as far as 4,500 feet 
from a wellsite.45 Used together, these techniques have the 
potential to reduce surface disturbance, because horizontal drilling 
can access subsurface deposits of gas via fewer surface 
perforations that conventional drilling allows.46 However, less 
surface disturbance comes at the expense of subsurface integrity, 
which can be cause for concern given the potential for both 
chemical-laced fracking fluid and natural gas to migrate into and 
contaminate aquifers and groundwater supplies.47 In addition, the 
sudden increase in profitability due to new access to gas deposits 
has incentivized a rush to states with hydrocarbon-rich 
formations.48 Many fear that the rapid onset of a high level of 
fracking will generate novel problems at a rate and scale that will 
make them difficult to detect or address adequately.49 
                                                          
more probable than subsurface contamination. See id. at 6-15 to -17. 
43 See Natural Gas Hydro-Fracking in Shale, CITIZENS CAMPAIGN FOR THE 
ENV’T, http://www.citizenscampaign.org/campaigns/hydro-fracking.asp (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
44 Video recording: Shale Gas Drilling: Pros and Cons, 60 MINUTES (Nov. 
14, 2010, 12:34 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/ 
?id=7054210n (interview with Chesapeake Energy CEO Aubrey McClendon). 
Note that well depths in the Marcellus could extend down more than 5,000 feet 
below the earth’s surface in some places. See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 4-15. 
45 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 5-22. However, even though there may be 
fewer wellsites, each wellpad disturbs more surface area than smaller wellpads 
for conventional gas production. Id. at 5-21. 
46 Id. at 5-20.  See also id. at 6-153. 
47 Id. at 6-34 to -37; see, e.g., Delen Goldberg, Tioga County Man Blames 
Nearby Gas Drilling for Polluting His Well, SYRACUSE.COM (Jan. 2, 2010, 6:00 
AM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/01/tioga_county_man_ 
blames_natura.html. 
48 Harper, supra note 31, at 5. 
49  SUSAN RIHA, DIR., N.Y. WATER RESOURCES INST. & CHARLES L. PECK, 
PROF. DEP’T OF EARTH & ATMOSPHERIC SCI., CORNELL UNIV. ET AL., 
COMMENTS ON DRAFT SGEIS ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING 
REGULATORY PROGRAM [hereinafter Riha et al., Comments], available at 
http://cce.cornell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/NaturalGasDev/Documents/PDFs/
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B. Natural Gas in New York State 
Due to the State’s geologic and hydrologic features, natural gas 
has been mined in New York since the 1820s, long before the oil 
and gas industry pioneered methods to extract gas from hard shales 
like the Marcellus.50 Prior to the development of hydrofracking and 
horizontal drilling methods, gas extraction in New York State was 
on the decline due to the inability of producers to access gas 
trapped in shale.51 Growing energy demands over the past fifty 
years have focused industry and government attention on 
developing domestic shale gas resources.52 In addition, the 
construction of a major natural gas pipeline through New York’s 
Southern Tier53 and the proximity of nearby gas markets in the rest 
of the state, as well as in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, have 
directed industry efforts towards New York and other Marcellus 
states.54  
The Marcellus formation is attractive because it has an 
extensive range, covering nearly thirty-four million acres from 
New York to Tennessee.55 A 2008 report estimates that there are as 
                                                          
dSGEIS%20Comments%20_Riha_.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). 
50 Native Americans introduced early explorers of western New York to 
naturally occurring natural gas springs in Ontario County and near the present 
day town of Canandaigua, in Allegany County. The first gas well was drilled in 
Devonian shale near the town of Fredonia, Chataqua county, in 1821, and gas 
extraction has occurred in the state ever since. JOHN P. HERRICK, EMPIRE OIL: 
THE STORY OF OIL IN NEW YORK STATE 316–25 (1949); SGEIS, supra note 29, 
at 4-1. 
51 HERRICK, supra note 50, at 316–76; SGEIS, supra note 29, at 4-2 to -3; 
Harper, supra note 31, at 3–5. 
52 Marcellus Shale, supra note 2. 
53 The Millennium Pipeline is a natural gas pipeline that was completed in 
2008 and extends across the southern tier of New York from Corning to Ramapo 
supplying customers including National Grid, Con Edison, Central Hudson Gas 
& Electric, and Orange & Rockland Utilities. Millennium Pipeline, NISOURCE 
GAS TRANSMISSION & STORAGE, http://www.ngts.com/about-ngts/millennium-
pipeline/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).  
54 Marcellus Shale, supra note 2. 
55 Terry Engelder & Gary G. Lash, Marcellus Shale Play’s Vast Resource 
Potential Creating Stir in Appalachia, AM. OIL & GAS REP., May 2008, at 7,  
available at http://www.geosc.psu.edu/~engelder/references/link150.pdf; see 
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many as five hundred trillion cubic feet of natural gas in place, 
with fifty trillion cubic feet recoverable.56 The New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) estimates that 
roughly eight to ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas could be 
recovered over time from the Marcellus in New York,57 where 
statewide annual consumption is over one trillion cubic yards.58 
Thus, the Marcellus presents New Yorkers with an intrastate 
source of energy, a valued prospect during a period when the 
nation seeks alternative bridge fuels.59 In addition, below the 
Marcellus lie other shale formations that most likely will be subject 
to exploration and extraction in the future.60 
C. Hydraulic Fracturing: Potential Harms and Benefits 
The hydrofracking process61 has already been used in other 
states, providing a sense of what New York faces in the near 
future. The technique was pioneered in the 1990s as a means to 
force the last remaining gas from old wells in the Barnett Shale in 
Texas.62 Fracking has also been used to varying extents throughout 
the country, most extensively in the West.63 In the East, the first 
                                                          
also Marcellus Shale – Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, GEOLOGY.COM, 
http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
56 A more recent estimate asserted that as much as 489 trillion cubic feet 
might be recoverable. Wiseman, supra note 4, at 240; Marcellus 2008: Report 
Card on the Breakout Year for Gas Production in the Appalachian Basin, BASIN 
OIL & GAS MAG., Aug. 2009, at 18, available at http://fwbog.com/index.php? 
page=article&article=144.  
57 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 4-24. 
58 Marcellus Shale, supra note 2. 
59 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 2-2. 
60 See id. at 4-6, 4-9, 6-151; see also Marcellus Shale – Appalachian Basin 
Natural Gas Play, supra note 55 (discussing the potential for drilling in the 
Utica shale layer). 
61 I use the term “hydrofracking” to refer to a process that pairs horizontal 
drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing. 
62 Lavelle, supra note 30. 
63 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 2-3. To access stories about hydraulic 
fracturing across the nation, see Gas Drilling: The Story So Far, PROPUBLICA 
(June 26, 2010, 9:42 AM), http://www.propublica.org/series/buried-secrets-gas-
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high-volume fracking operations are in Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia.64 
There are a number of documented or suspected harms from 
hydrofracking operations. These range from quality of life issues, 
such as persistent noise and vibrations from drilling and 
underground injection, to health impacts from exposure to air and 
water pollutants, to property value destruction, to social 
disruption.65 Specific concerns include: the threat that gas or 
fracking fluid can pollute groundwater;66 toxic air emissions from 
gas leaks, processing, gas “flaring” and truck exhaust;67 erosion 
from construction and pipeline siting;68 degradation of surface 
waterways from leaks, accidental chemical spills, and stormwater 
runoff;69 noise and light pollution;70 increased truck traffic and 
roadway deterioration;71 and destruction of ecologically sensitive 
habitat and the landscape.72 Other potential problems include 
                                                          
drillings-environmental-threat (providing multiple sources and reports on 
hydrofracking activity throughout the United States). 
64 See How Big Is the Gas Drilling Regulatory Staff in Your State?, 
PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/gas-drilling-regulatory-staffing/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2011), to compare drilling and regulatory oversight data 
between States. 
65 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at ch. 6. 
66 Id. at 6-3–6-41; see Michael Rubinkam, Firm Finds Fracking Fluid in 
Dimock Well, TIMES LEADER (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.timesleader.com/news 
/hottopics/shale/Firm_finds_fracking_chemicals_in_Dimock_well_09-16-
2010.html. 
67 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-109 to -123. 
68 Id. at 6-16; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, Dir., Soil and 
Water Conservation District, Tioga County, NY (Oct. 4, 2010). 
69 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-15 to -16. 
70 Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, County Att’y, Tioga County, 
NY (Oct. 20, 2010). 
71  SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-138 to -139; Telephone Interview with Dick 
Le Count, Director, Emergency Management Office, Tioga County, NY (Oct. 
19, 2010). 
72 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-44 to -47, 6-139 to -140 (discussing potential 
for invasive species introductions and increased access to remote areas and 
disturbance, which are the kinds of activities that pose threats to ecologically 
sensitive areas). Interview with Elaine Jardine, Dir. of Planning, Tioga County, 
NY in Owego, NY (Oct. 15, 2010); Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, 
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chemical fires and gas explosions73 and hydrofracking fluid and 
solid waste disposal,74 including disposal of waste high in naturally 
occurring radioactive elements (“NORMS”).75 In addition, 
subsurface interference could cause seismic disturbance and trigger 
earthquakes.76 More likely, seismic disruption could induce 
fractures in subsurface faults, causing gas to migrate into aquifers 
and thus contaminate creeks, wells, and other waterways.77 
Migration of gas into water sources and aquifers is of particular 
concern in a water-rich state like New York, where surface and 
groundwater connections are extensive.78 Hydrofracking in the 
Catskills poses a potentially grave threat to New York City’s water 
supply, which is fed by surface streams and groundwater. 
Furthermore, some are concerned that drillers and consumers will 
be forced to compete for water, especially during summer months 
when water sources are low.79 A heavy burden on water bodies is 
also likely to result in diminished water quality and higher 
concentrations of pollutants.80 Finally, the potential for social 
disruption is considerable as municipalities face new injections of 
                                                          
supra note 70. 
73 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71. 
74 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-40. See also Ian Urbina, Drilling Down: 
Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/27gas.html 
?pagewanted=1&hp [hereinafter Drilling Down]. 
75 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-40. See also Drilling Down, supra note 74. 
76 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 4-33, 4-35 (describing human-triggered seismic 
events, such as underground injection). See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Arkansas 
Quake Is Its Most Powerful in 35 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, at A14, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/us/01earthquakes.html?_r= 
1&hp; BJ Austin, Another Earthquake Hits Cleburne, KERA (July 10, 2009), 
http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/kera/news.newsmain/article/0/1/1528548/No
rth.Texas/Another.Earthquake.Hits.Cleburne. 
77 N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, FINAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
REPORT: IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION IN THE NEW 
YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY WATERSHED 13 (2009), available at http://www. 
nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/natural_gas_drilling/12_23_2009_final_assessment_repor
t.pdf. 
78 Id. at 13–20. 
79 Riha et al., Comments, supra note 49. 
80 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-3 to -14. 
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wealth, sudden land use changes, and large influxes of temporary 
workers.81  
Hydrofracking primarily occurs on private or state-owned 
lands leased by extractors, also known as landmen, who 
compensate landowners with lease and royalty payments.82 
Conflicts between industry and landowners have arisen over leases 
in other parts of the country and often have been resolved to the 
disadvantage of landowners.83 In addition, landowners who do not 
wish to enter lease agreements can see their interests compromised 
due to common law interpretations of rights to subsurface 
migratory resources, such as the Rule of Capture.84 Drilling in New 
                                                          
81 Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. See also 
SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-139 to -140 (discussing some of the kinds of 
disruption that occur before and during drilling).  
82 N.Y. ST. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., OIL AND GAS LEASES (2008), 
available at http://tiogagaslease.org/images/OAG_Gas_Lease_Brochure.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2010); Prerequisites for Capturing the Benefits from New 
York’s Natural Oil and Gas Resource Endowment, NYSERDA 35–36, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/nyserda6.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2011).  
83 Courts have interpreted royalty and compensation disputes in favor of oil 
and gas industry interests even though the industry enjoys informational and 
strategic advantages such as greater familiarity with contracts. See Thomas A. 
Mitchell, The Future of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: Past as Prologue, 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 379, 406 (2010). In some instance, gas companies have seemed 
to take advantage of informational disparities. Telephone Interview with Judith 
Quigley, supra note 70. As an example, some gas companies have been 
pursuing leases in New York since the early 1980s, and some residents have 
been displeased to see their neighbors, who have held out longer or begun to 
organize, achieve significantly better lease terms and higher compensation 
arrangements. Id. In some cases, compensation has increased from $20/acre up 
to $3000/acre over period of a few years. Id.; Telephone Interview with Wendy 
Walsh, supra note 68. See also Marcellus Shale – Appalachian Basin Gas Play, 
supra note 55; Michael Rubinkam, The Marcellus Dilemma: One Family’s 
Struggle with a Giant Natural Gas Company, ITHACA J. (Nov. 25, 2010, 6:05 
PM), http://www.theithacajournal.com/article/20101125/NEWS01/11250342/ 
The+Marcellus+dilemma++One+family+s+struggle+with+a+giant+natural+gas
+company. 
84 See Mitchell, supra note 83, at 406 (noting that natural gas from the 
Marcellus “will be leased, developed, and produced . . . solely under the ‘pure’ 
rule of capture as articulated at the end of the nineteenth century.”). 
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York State is also permitted on public lands, although with 
limitation; drilling is not allowed within the Adirondack State Park 
or in parts of the Catskills.85  
Despite the myriad potential harms from hydrofracking, many 
New York politicians and residents wish to encourage it and 
support permissive regulation.86 Gas production is enormously 
profitable and brings hard-to-resist economic benefits to 
landowners and depressed areas of the state.87 At the time of 
writing, royalties from just one acre of leased land can total about 
$180,000 a year, in addition to a signing bonus of several hundred 
to several thousand dollars.88 Multiply that amount by the many 
acres that a lessor might own and it becomes clear why, for many 
individual landowners, the incentives to permit drilling outweigh 
the costs.89 Relatedly, increased gas production brings job 
opportunities to economically depressed areas of the state, so 
landowners are not the only ones who benefit from 
hydrofracking.90 In addition, natural gas is characterized by many 
as a fuel critical to bridge the transition from oil to renewable and 
                                                          
85 Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. See also 
SGEIS, supra note 29, at 1-2 to -3. 
86 See, e.g., Delen Goldberg, Many Central New York Lawmakers 
Undecided on Hydrofracking, SYRACUSE.COM (Jan. 17, 2010, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/01/central_new_york_lawmakers
_str.html. 
87 See Clifford Krauss & Tom Zeller, Jr., When a Rig Moves in Next Door, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/11/07/business/energy-environment/07frack.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 
&sq=hydraulic%20fracturing%20farmers&st=cse&scp=2. 
88 This is based on a typical royalty rate of 12.5%, a production average of 
one million cubic feet per day, and the last available published natural gas rate 
per cubic foot, $3.96 (rate in December, 2010), for a one acre unit. See Natural 
Gas Royalty Estimate, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/royalty/ (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2011), for a “royalty calculator.” Note that production averages range 
from .2 to 2 million cubic feet per day. Id. Last available gas rate was taken 
from Natural Gas Navigator, U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (last updated Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3M.htm.  
89 See Krauss & Zeller, supra note 87. 
90 Id. 
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other domestic energy sources.91   
Yet, despite the potential economic benefits, the sudden influx 
of enormous profits to previously depressed areas of New York 
State may create another series of long-lasting and destructive 
effects. Existing socioeconomic divisions are likely to be 
exacerbated, creating environmental justice concerns.92 Those who 
benefit financially from leasing their land will be able to afford to 
relocate away from any environmental or public health hazards 
caused by hydrofracking, with their departures diminishing the 
local tax base. Meanwhile neighbors without financial resources 
may have no choice but to remain.93 Moreover, some who lease 
their land may find it difficult or impossible to sell once 
hydrofracking has begun, or realize that their property has 
significantly diminished in value.94 Hydrofracking operations and 
impacts may also make land undesirable for other uses—especially 
if contamination has occurred. In addition, some farmers may 
cease operations in light of fracking windfalls, which could alter 
the landscape significantly.95 However, despite its risks, the 
                                                          
91 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 2-2. 
92 Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
93 Id. 
94 See BBC Research and Consulting, Measuring the Impact of Coalbed 
Methane Wells on Property Values (Greystone Environmental Consultants, Inc., 
La Plata County, CO & Durango, CO, Working Paper 2001), available at 
https://docs.google.com/fileview?id=0Bwsxa7SpCLLDZTllNWUzMzItMTM4
NS00ZDliLTgwODktMzgxM2RjMjg5OGQ1&hl=en (demonstrating diminished 
property values of land near comparable coalbed methane mining operations in 
Colorado); Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Dark Side of a Natural Gas Boom, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/12/08/business/energy-environment/08fracking.html?_r=1 (describing 
Pennsylvania woman’s fears that water contamination from hydrofracking have 
made her newly built home unsaleable). 
95 This is already happening, as some farmers who formerly struggled have 
ceased farming due to windfalls. However, it is important to note that “gas 
drilling is allowing farmers to stay on their land, which is environmentally 
superior to selling it off piecemeal for suburbanization.” Peter Applebome, Will 
New York Rebel Against Fracking?, GREEN BLOG, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2010, 
2:17 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/will-new-york-rebel-
against-fracking/?scp=2&sq=hydraulic+fracturing+farmers&st=nyt; see also 
Krauss & Zeller, supra note 87. 
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immediate and short-term benefits make hydrofracking difficult for 
many in the state to reject and make its regulation a subject of 
considerable controversy.96 
II. THE DEBATE OVER ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM  
Congress has enacted a number of environmental laws with the 
broadly ambitious goals of protecting human health and the 
environment.97 These statutes have engendered considerable 
discussion and disagreement over how to balance federal, state, 
and local roles in the execution of the laws while achieving 
protection adequate to satisfy congressional mandates.98 The 
debate over environmental federalism concerns how best to 
conceive of environmental problems, how to characterize the 
achievement of statutory goals, and how to distribute regulatory 
authority among the three levels of government.99 Analysis of the 
various perspectives on environmental federalism reveals the 
difficulties inherent in solving complex environmental 
problems.100 However, it is the complex nature of these problems 
that suggests that adaptive regulatory approaches may be more 
suitable than matching approaches at meeting these challenges.101 
                                                          
96 See supra note 10; Krauss & Zeller, supra note 87; infra Parts III.C.1–2. 
97 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW 
AND POLICY 73–74 (2007). See, e.g., CAA (with the purpose “to protect and 
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 
7401(b)(1) (West 2010)); CWA (with objective to “restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1251(a) (West 2010)); and NEPA (with purposes “to promote efforts which 
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and 
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the 
ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.” 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 4321 (West (2010)). 
98 See infra Part II.B. 
99 See infra Part II.B. 
100 See infra Part II.B. 
101 See infra Part II.B, Parts IV.B–C. 
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A. Federal Environmental Law 
Beginning in 1969, and throughout the 1980s, Congress 
enacted a host of federal environmental statutes that together 
articulate a broad goal to protect public resources, including air, 
water, human health, and ecological integrity.102 These statutes 
enjoyed wide political support, which is frequently attributed to a 
popular recognition of threats to the environment after several 
highly publicized disasters.103 Some of these new laws expanded 
existing schemes, but as a whole they embody an unprecedented 
and comprehensive approach to protection that acknowledges the 
irreplaceable value of our environment.104 
Federal environmental laws use a variety of means to achieve 
their ends, but one hallmark is their reliance on federal and state 
implementation and enforcement roles.105 In the more 
“cooperative” schemes, the federal government, generally through 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), sets minimum 
standards that industry or states must meet before being subject to 
sanctions.106 Laws like the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act 
(CWA), Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) require 
states to devise and implement comprehensive plans to meet 
                                                          
102 Including regulation under: NEPA (review of federal actions for 
environmental impacts), CAA (clean air), CWA (clean water), OSHA 
(workplace safety), FIFRA (pesticide regulation), SDWA (safe drinking water), 
RCRA (disposal of hazardous materials), TSCA (toxic substances), and 
CERCLA (hazardous and polluted sites). 
103 Motivating events include a chemical leak at a Union Carbide plant in 
Bhopal, India, that immediately killed over 3,000 people, contamination of a 
middle-class housing development at Love Canal in upstate New York, high 
levels of pollution in the Cuyahoga River that caused it to catch fire, and the 
popularity of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.  See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE 
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59–60, 110–11 (2004); Robert V. Percival, 
Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1158–59 (1995). 
104 Lazarus, supra note 103, at 59–60; 110–11. 
105 Percival, supra note 103, at 1171–78. 
106 Id. at 1141, 1171–78. 
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federal goals.107 Depending on the set of issues at hand, the federal 
government sets a regulatory floor, which empowers states to 
formulate regulations for activities within their borders that are 
more stringent than the federal standards but prevents any state 
from allowing suboptimal standards.108 These schemes also have 
permitting or enforcement components, where actors engaging in 
certain kinds of activity are required to comply with federal 
standards directly.109 Other schemes, like the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), and EPCRA’s Toxics Release Inventory, are directly 
administered by federal authorities, while still providing some 
roles for the states.110 State law and police powers are included in 
these schemes via savings clauses or where state law does not 
conflict with, or prevent implementation or enforcement of, federal 
law—except to the extent that state law has been expressly or 
impliedly preempted.111 
Several models are used to explain the need for federal 
regulation in the face of issues that concern resources held in 
common.112 These concepts not only describe the kinds of 
comprehensive schemes that can be desirable, but also try to 
predict human behavior by focusing on the logic and incentives 
that lead to collective action problems. One such explanation is the 
“tragedy of the commons,” which describes how individual actors 
are driven by short-term self-interest to pollute a commonly held 
resource even where each individual knows the group’s collective 
actions will eventually destroy or seriously damage it.113 The 
tragedy is that even where the specter of damage is apparent to all, 
the lack of capacity to overcome coordination barriers leads to an 
                                                          
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id.; see Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 17, at 1554 (noting role of 
state standards where a federal floor has been set). 
112 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 4–11, 86–91. 
113 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 
1243–48 (1968). 
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ostensibly inevitable and disastrous outcome.114 The federal 
government can be seen as capable or necessary to overcome 
collective action problems with the resources and information to 
identify the nation’s needs and the authority to force compliance 
with standards designed to protect both present and future 
interests.115  
The tragedy of the commons can be pervasive even after 
regulation is implemented; short-term interests often continue to 
weigh more heavily in decision making than long term or future 
interests, and additional incentives and political motivations come 
to bear.116 As is highlighted in the hydrofracking context, one of 
the drivers of commons problems even after extensive regulation is 
the fact that the benefits and costs of regulation are often 
conceived of as reciprocal.117 Benefits to industry in the form of 
less regulation can be correlated with costs of protecting public 
health and the environment from harm or increased risk of harm.118 
Thus, the operative inquiry for policymakers concerns who should 
bear the cost of regulation, which can be discussed in terms of 
efficiency or may require reaching normative conclusions about 
who ought to bear the burdens environmental harms present. The 
idea that harms are reciprocal is the building block of arguments 
that posit that regulation becomes inefficient when it is overly 
cautious and leads to unnecessary costs, as in the form of lost 
jobs.119 
The “race-to-the-bottom” paradigm has also been used to 
                                                          
114 Id. 
115 Id.; GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 8–11 (discussing the role of 
the influence of the “tragedy of the commons” on environmental federalism 
scholarship). 
116 See generally Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 17 
(introducing discussion of “regulatory commons” problems that persist after a 
regulatory regime is instituted). 
117 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960) (introducing discussion of reciprocal harms); see also 
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 13–15 (2007) (discussing the role of the 
Coase Theorem on environmental law structures and the “polluter pays” 
principle). 
118 Id.  
119 See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 16–17. 
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defend federal intervention in environmental issues.120 Proponents 
of this argument allege that absent federal involvement, state 
competition for mobile industry resources will lead state regulators 
to lower environmental standards to suboptimal levels.121 The race-
to-the-bottom has been the subject of much discussion within the 
field of environmental law and although contested, there is at least 
some empirical evidence to suggest that it does occur.122 More 
consequentially, study of whether or not states engage in a race-to-
the-bottom has revealed that state regulators may feel compelled to 
lower standards to attract industry even where there is no actual 
need to do so.123 Thus, as a threshold matter, state regulators 
appear to tend towards making underprotective policy choices. 
B. The Debate About Environmental Federalism 
Disagreement over how best to implement the existing federal 
environmental laws has given rise to debate about environmental 
                                                          
120 Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1196, 1213 (1977); see also GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 15–27. 
121 The “race to the bottom” has its origins in labor law and policy. See, 
e.g., Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
122 Compare Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the “Race-To-The-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992), with Kirsten H. Engel, State 
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) [hereinafter State Environmental Standard-
Setting], and Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn 
Things:” An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the Race-
To-The-Bottom in Federal Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 
(1998) [hereinafter Facts Are Stubborn Things]. 
123 Engel and Saleska & Engel presented empirical evidence to show that 
even if state policymakers do not actually “need” to lower standards to attract 
industry, they continue to believe that standard-lowering is necessary. See State 
Environmental Standard-Setting, supra note 122; Facts Are Stubborn Things, 
supra note 122. In fact, the race to the bottom might be a misnomer if applied in 
the context of natural gas extraction. With gas, the concern is not with mobile 
industry in the typical sense. Rather, gas companies will likely seek to access the 
extent of gas wherever it is available, limited only by technological feasibility, 
so interstate competition is less operative.  
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federalism. Discussion revolves around how to balance federal, 
state, and local interests.124 Some scholars argue for economics-
based approaches to determine what level of government should 
have regulatory primacy,125 while others attempt to respond to the 
complex systems that environmental laws govern and the 
behavioral forces that appear to motivate regulators.126 However, 
given the complexity of environmental problems and federal laws 
that, in many cases, require regulation regardless of cost, adaptive 
approaches that seek to respond to the dynamic nature of 
environmental issues are more likely than market based approaches 
to result in effective policy.127 
1. Economics and The “Matching Principle”  
For the past three decades, academics have debated how to 
apportion authority over environmental problems most effectively, 
without encouraging overregulation.128 A large part of the 
discussion has turned to economics arguments, which seek 
efficiency-based means of determining whether the federal 
government or the states should have primacy.129 One argument 
posits that, contrary to conventional wisdom concerning the race-
to-the-bottom, states are more likely to maximize all social goods 
because federal intervention impedes accurate expression of state 
preferences through state policy choices and market 
mechanisms.130 Building on this idea, and the related assumption 
that inducing internalization of costs leads industry and regulators 
alike to make more efficient choices, some academics have 
                                                          
124 See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
125 See infra Part II.B.1. 
126 See infra Part II.B.2. 
127 See infra Parts II.B.2 & IV. 
128 See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 122; Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional 
Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 131–33 
(2005); Stewart, supra note 120, at 1210; Butler & Macey, supra note 18, at 25. 
129 See Adaptive Federalism, supra note 16, at 1802–07 (describing and 
criticizing prevailing economics-based theories).  
130 Compare Revesz, supra note 122, with State Environmental Standard-
Setting, supra note 122, and Facts Are Stubborn Things, supra note 122. 
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espoused the “matching principle,” which involves identifying the 
best match between a level of government and the geography of an 
environmental problem.131 Under matching theories, the federal 
government may be the most efficient regulator in some instances, 
but state or local regulation is most appropriate much of the 
time.132 Thus, geographic correlation between problems and 
regulatory authorities should guide any attempts to regulate.133 A 
corollary of this argument is that one-size-fits-all federal 
regulations are ineffective due to highly disparate ecological and 
social conditions across the states.134 
Despite their elegance, economics-based or efficiency-focused 
models may not be well suited to addressing environmental issues. 
Environmental laws confront problems that can appear to have 
clear geographic boundaries but in fact defy clear delineation.135 
Theories that rely on market or regulatory preferences to measure 
social goods also run the risk of under-representing non-economic 
or hard-to-price values, pervasive in environmental issues,136 given 
widespread reliance on cost-benefit analysis in orienting such 
preferences. Moreover, these theories fail to appreciate fully that 
social goods and ills, even if reciprocal, are rarely cleanly 
symmetrical. These theories may also ignore the role uncertainty 
plays in policymaking or the wide variety of interests and “hidden” 
considerations that can skew regulatory incentives.137 Furthermore, 
                                                          
131 See Adler, supra note 128; Butler & Macey, supra note 18, at 25. 
132 See Adler, supra note 128; Butler & Macey, supra note 18, at 25. 
133 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 128, at 137–39 (discussing the need for 
decentralization and the variable needs of different regions). 
134 Stewart, supra note 120, at 1210; see generally Colloquium, State Roles 
in U.S. Environmental Law and Policy, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (2005); Dan 
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). 
135 See, for example, the difficulty the Supreme Court has had in trying to 
reconcile agency interpretation manifesting a “scientific” understanding of what 
delineates a wetland with the statutory meaning of “waters of the United States” 
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 
159 (2001); and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
136 See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 15–27. 
137 See Facts Are Stubborn Things, supra note 122, at 74–84 (discussing 
political, behavioral, and risk-based incentive structures that may come to bear 
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tautological approaches that rely on preferences to arrange 
themselves into a balance between goods and ills and then define 
that equilibrium as achievement of maximum efficiency lack 
normative direction.138 Finally, efficiency-focused arguments do 
not fully address the iterative possibilities139 created by a three-
tiered system or the potential for exploitation of institutional 
differences across levels of government to increase efficiency of 
the existing environmental law framework.140 The weaknesses in 
efficiency arguments are particularly relevant where information 
about systems and risk is both largely incomplete and contested 
and where economic pressures distort public choice.141 
2. Adaptive Federalism and the Regulatory Commons 
One theory has recently emerged that describes an “ecological” 
approach to environmental federalism.142 Critiquing economics-
based theories as ill equipped to address the complexity of 
environmental issues, not to mention the environmental law 
framework, Kirsten H. Engel and David E. Adelman describe 
“adaptive federalism” as a form of federalism that embraces 
flexibility and overlap, features that make ecological systems more 
durable.143 According to Engel and Adelman, adaptive federalism 
is likely to be more responsive to the complexities and variation 
inherent in environmental problems and to result in higher levels of 
protection than the “classical” or “static” conceptions, like the 
matching principle, which they argue assume away critical 
                                                          
on regulatory decision making). See also Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: 
Charting the New Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L. J. 863 (2010) (discussing complex 
nature of transaction costs and how these create “Coasean blind spots” that 
complicate decision making in environmental disputes).  
138 See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 14–16 (2010).  
139 See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1097, 1099–1103 (2009). 
140 See generally Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 16. 
141 See KYSAR, supra note 138, at 71–75. 
142 Adaptive Federalism, supra note 16, at 1817–20. 
143 Id. at 1832; see also Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism, 
supra note 19, at 179. 
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variables.144 By contrast, adaptive federalism relies on the 
institutional stability of our existing environmental law while 
encouraging flexibility that allows regulators to react to an ever-
evolving body of information.145 
William Buzbee’s discussion of the regulatory commons 
supplements adaptive federalism by focusing on the operative 
concerns about overregulation that motivate proponents of 
matching approaches.146 Buzbee points out that matching 
jurisdiction to environmental problems can be difficult because 
many issues are cross-jurisdictional.147 Buzbee argues that even 
where there appears to be too much regulation, as in apparently 
robust regulatory frameworks, gaps develop due to perceptions of 
jurisdictional inadequacy, paucity of incentives, and political 
machinations.148 Regulators become inattentive to regulatory 
opportunities because, for instance, multiple regulators share 
jurisdiction, or causes and effects of an activity make it difficult to 
identify the regulatory body with controlling jurisdiction.149 
Buzbee’s discussion suggests that the etiology of commons 
problems is structural and behavioral, and may be pervasive even 
where a state has sole regulatory authority. Moreover, despite the 
potential for jurisdictional confusion that overlapping vertical 
jurisdiction presents,150 one can conclude that regulatory commons 
problems are more likely to be prevented by clarifying roles and 
granting a variety of regulators increased responsibility for 
problems than by contracting jurisdiction and reducing available 
resources.151 
                                                          
144 Adaptive Federalism, supra note 16, at 1799.  
145 See generally id. 
146 See generally Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 17. 
147 Id. at 22–28. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id.; Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 16, at 126; 
Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 17. 
151 See Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 17. 
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III. HYDROFRACKING: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Several holes in federal environmental laws allow 
hydrofracking to escape federal oversight.152 Some exemptions 
have been explicitly placed in statutes.153 Other aspects of 
hydrofracking slip through loopholes in the laws or simply do not 
trigger the existing scheme.154 Therefore, regulatory authority has 
been handed to state governments. New York’s proposed regime 
may not provide adequate protection from hydrofracking’s 
harms.155 In addition, New York prevents local governments from 
exercising direct regulatory authority over hydrofracking 
processes, leaving localities vulnerable to potential environmental 
and public health harms.156  
A. Federal Regulation 
Like any activity with an impact on the environment, federal 
environmental laws touch upon aspects of hydrofracking.157 
However, the oil and gas industry successfully lobbied for 
exemptions for hydrofracking158 from several major federal 
environmental laws, many of which went into effect with the 
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“the Act”).159 
Apparently, the view that exemption from federal statutes and 
                                                          
152 See infra Part III.A.; see also note 4. 
153 See infra Part III.A.; see also note 4. 
154 See infra Part III.A. 
155 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
156 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
157 See infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
158 See, e.g., Dennis Lathem, LEAF v. EPA: A Challenge to Hydraulic 
Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Wells in Alabama, COALBED METHANE 
ASSOCIATION OF ALABAMA (July 1, 2001), http://www.energyindepth.org/PDF/ 
LEAF_v_EPA.pdf.  
159 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594, 694 
(2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections throughout the U.S. Code); 
See also NAT’L ENERGY POL’Y DEVEL. GRP., NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: 
RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR 
AMERICA’S FUTURE viii–xv (2001), available at http://www.wtrg.com/Energy 
Report/National-Energy-Policy.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L ENERGY POL’Y]. 
POWERS - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:18 PM 
 Fracking and Federalism 939 
reduced federal oversight of oil and gas development would lead to 
increased energy independence and development of so-called 
bridge fuels, like natural gas, prevailed in Congress.160 However, 
some critics are suspicious of the motives behind what skeptics 
have termed the “Halliburton loophole.”161 Whatever its intent, 
Congress removed federal oversight of most aspects of 
hydrofracking and its component practices. 
Section 322 of the Act exempts hydraulic fracturing from the 
SDWA, which protects public and municipal water supplies from 
underground injection and disposal of hazardous substances 
through imposition of water quality standards.162 Further, the Act 
effectively exempted wellpad construction activities associated 
with hydrofracking from the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) under the CWA.163 In addition, 
because Congress rolled hydrofracking-related practices into its 
                                                          
160 Congress’ characterization of the Act is aligned with the views of the 
Energy Policy Development Group, as expressed in NAT’L ENERGY POL’Y, 
supra note 159, at viii-xv; the conference report states that the Act is meant “to 
ensure jobs for our future with secure, affordable, and reliable energy.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 109–190, at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 448, 448. See 
also infra notes 159–67 and accompanying text. 
161 The exemptions have been termed the “Halliburton Loophole” because 
Halliburton pioneered much of the hydrofracking technology, and Vice 
President Cheney, formerly a Chief Executive Officer of Halliburton, has been 
widely criticized for permitting industry representatives and lobbyists to 
participate in a secret task force to create energy policy early in the tenure of the 
Bush Administration. Some believe the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is a 
legislative expression of many of the policies hashed out by that task force. See 
Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, at A28, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.html?scp=1& 
sq=halliburton+loophole&st=nyt.  
162 See Energy Policy Act, §§ 322–23, 119 Stat. 594, 694, amending the 
SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d), to exclude underground injection from hydraulic 
fracturing. Previously, in 1997, the 11th Circuit had ruled that that, under the 
SDWA, the EPA had to regulate “underground injection.” Legal Environmental 
Assistance Foundation v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997).  
163 Effect of Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, Clean Water Act, and 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46445.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Effect of Federal Safe Drinking Water Act]. 
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exemption language, it potentially expanded existing oil and gas 
exemptions in CERCLA to aspects of site construction, drilling, 
and postfracking production.164 The Act also weakened review 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by 
presuming that certain categorical exclusions apply for oil and gas 
extraction.165 Hydrofracking is also exempt from RCRA, which 
provides for federal oversight of storage and disposal of hazardous 
materials,166 and from toxic substance reporting requirements 
under EPCRA.167  
Hydrofracking is not entirely beyond the scope of federal 
oversight, yet significant federal involvement is unlikely given the 
structure of potentially applicable laws. States must still meet 
water quality standards under the CWA and the CAA’s national 
ambient air quality standards via existing state-formulated plans. 
However, current interpretations of “navigable waterways” make it 
unlikely that the federal government has jurisdiction under the 
CWA to regulate emissions unless a “significant nexus” exists 
between an impacted groundwater connection and navigable 
waters.168 Establishing a “significant nexus” is likely a difficult 
showing in the hydrofracking context, as most impacts will be on 
groundwater sources that are hard if not impossible to trace to 
navigable waters.169 In addition, the EPA will not aggregate air 
                                                          
164 WHAT’S THE HYDRO-FRACKING RUSH, supra note 4, at 12. 
165 Id. 
166 See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 251 n.125. 
167 Effect of Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, supra note 163; see also 
CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986) (codified in scattered 
sections throughout the U.S. Code). 
168 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 787 (2006). Justice Kennedy 
articulated the “significant nexus” test in his concurrence; although not 
commanding a majority, his position essentially embodies the nexus between the 
majority and the dissent in Rapanos, suggesting to lower courts that his 
formulation should govern their decisions. See id. 
169 Proving hydrologic connections is likely to be difficult because it may 
be impossible to determine where and how much fracking fluid will travel 
subsurface after injection. Furthermore, Rapanos has proven difficult for lower 
courts to apply and has led to erratic results. See Gregory H. Morrison, Note, A 
Nexus of Confusion: Why the Agencies Responsible for Clean Water Act 
Enforcement Should Promulgate a New Set of Rules Governing the Act’s 
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emissions from the various operations that occur on a wellpad, and 
the agency has exempted pollutants emitted by surface waste, like 
fracking fluid, from stationary source regulation under the CAA.170 
Courts are also unlikely to hold that the CAA applies to increased 
emissions from truck traffic.171 Finally, although savings clauses in 
federal laws preserve state police powers and common law 
authority,172 including tort liability for harm after the fact, standing 
and evidentiary hurdles typically prevent recovery in suits brought 
over environmental harms.173 Thus, the federal government has 
effectively vacated the field, and regulation of hydrofracking is 
achieved via a patchwork of state policies.174 Although industry 
often welcomes federal standard setting when faced with the 
burden of meeting a proliferation of state schemes,175 it is apparent 
that in the hydrofracking context, industry supporters have 
preferred a state-led approach.176 
B. State Regulatory Scheme 
State police power includes the authority to regulate activity 
that impacts natural resources and human health, and New York 
State has exercised this power to propose comparatively stringent 
                                                          
Jurisdiction, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 397 (2011); Stephen P. Louthan, 
Environmental Law: Post-Rapanos Rulings, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 25, 2006, 
available at http://www.cobar.org/docs/PostRapanosRulings.pdf?ID=2947. 
170 See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 251 n.125. 
171 See Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 
962, 963 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the CAA does not apply to emissions 
from increased truck traffic). 
172 Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 17, at 1550 (discussing savings 
clauses in the context of preemption doctrine). 
173 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 70–75 (5th ed. 2006).                                                                                                                     
174 See Wiseman, supra note 4, for a comprehensive comparison of state 
policies. 
175 Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 17, at 1569–70. 
176 See Letter from John Hoeven, Gov. of N.D., Chairman of Interstate Gas 
and Oil Compact Commission, to U.S. Reps. Tauzin and Dingell (Mar. 18, 
2003), available at http://www.energyindepth.org/PDF/Tauzin-Dingell.pdf. 
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environmental regulations on hydrofracking.177 Article 23 of the 
New York Environmental Conservation Law178 (“Article 23”) 
establishes the DEC’s broad jurisdiction to regulate oil and gas 
extraction via its Division of Mineral Resources,179 with dual 
regulatory goals of encouragement of natural gas development and 
protection of correlative ownership.180 In addition, the Department 
of Transportation has jurisdiction over transportation of hazardous 
materials,181 and the Public Service Commission regulates siting of 
gas gathering lines, which is not subject to public review under the 
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), New York’s 
NEPA corollary.182 
Pursuant to SEQRA, the DEC has devised a land use focused 
regulatory strategy over hydrofracking implemented largely via 
permitting and reporting requirements.183 The DEC prepared its 
draft supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement 
(SGEIS), released in 2009, after receiving applications for permits 
to drill using high-volume hydrofracking methods.184 The SGEIS 
supplements the DEC’s Generic Environmental Impact 
Statement,185 which outlines the agency’s approach to conventional 
                                                          
177 See generally Wiseman, supra note 4. 
178 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION LAW  § 23-0301 (McKinney 2010). 
179 See Environmental Enforcement Law, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/40195.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2011); Well Owner and Applicants Information Center, N.Y. ST. DEP’T 
OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1522.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2011). 
180 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 550.1 (2010). 
181 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 5-5 to -6. DOT regulations specify that 
fracking fluid components should be separately trucked and mixed only onsite. 
Id. 
182 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 617.5(c)(35) (2010); see also 
SGEIS, supra note 29, at 5-129.  
183 SGEIS, supra note 29, at §§ 7.1.1, 7.1.1.1, 7.1.1.3–7.4. The DEC Plan 
relies on the Susquehanna River Basin Commission and the Delaware River 
Basin Commission to regulate water withdrawals from those bodies of water. 
184 Id. at 1-1. 
185 See generally GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE 
OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM, DIVISION OF MIN. 
RESOURCES, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (1992), available at 
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extraction methods and which proved inadequate to address the 
significantly greater environmental impacts from high volume 
hydrofracking.186  
The regulatory strategy the DEC has presented in the SGEIS 
concerns many New Yorkers. The most significant concern that 
critics share is that the agency is inadequately funded or staffed to 
ensure compliance with state regulations and policies.187 For 
instance, as of 2009, the Division of Mineral Resources had only 
sixteen enforcement staff members to oversee more than thirteen 
thousand conventional wells.188 Even drillers are concerned that 
their permits will be held up by administrative delays because 
DEC’s staff is inadequate to process the large number of 
forthcoming requests.189 
                                                          
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/45912.html. 
186 Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil, Gas 
and Solution Mining Regulatory Program: Well Permit Issuance for Horizontal 
Drilling and High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing to Develop the Marcellus Shale 
and Other Low-Permeability Gas Reservoirs, Executive Summary, DEC, 
http://dec.ny.gov/energy/47554.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
187 See RIVERKEEPER, COMMENTS ON THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING 
REGULATORY PROGRAM 1–3 (Dec. 28, 2009), available at http://www. 
riverkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Riverkeeper-DSGEIS-Comments-
12-28-09.pdf [hereinafter Riverkeeper Comments]; Riha et al., Comments, supra 
note 49; Specific Comments on the Draft Scope for the GEIS, N.Y. CITY DEP’T 
OF ENVTL. PROTECTION 1–2, 6 (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
dep/pdf/natural_gas_drilling/nycdep_comments_final_12-22-09.pdf [hereinafter 
DEP Comments]. 
188 Buried Secrets: Gas Drilling’s Environmental Impacts: New York, 
PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/gas-drilling-regulatory-staffing/ 
states/NY (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
189 Mireya Navarro, Cuts in State Agency Are Troubling, Environmentalists 
and Gas Drillers Agree, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, at A17, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/nyregion/23grannis.html?partner=rss&emc
=rss; IOGA of NY Supports Restoration of DEC Staff for Natural Gas 
Operations, INDEP. OIL & GAS ASS’N, http://iogany.org/news.php3 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2011); Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
Recently, former DEC Commissioner Grannis expressed concern that DEC staff 
was not even sufficiently equipped to handle the over 14,000 comments filed in 
response to the SGEIS. Allison Sickle, New York DEC Shorthanded to Reply to 
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Critics are also concerned that the DEC’s plan does not address 
the cumulative impacts of even routine aspects of hydrofracking.190 
The SGEIS deals with these effects in a cursory fashion and asserts 
that too much uncertainty exists to be able to assess them with 
accuracy.191 Many critics feel the DEC’s failure to address these 
impacts is unsatisfactory, for it is the uncertainty of these effects 
that frustrates attempts to prepare for them and compounds the risk 
of harm.192 For example, small-scale chemical spills, accidents, 
and incremental burdens on surface waters and infrastructure are 
difficult for localities to anticipate without more information about 
how extensive drilling will be.193 Some also suggest that the state 
has not recognized the extent of hidden economic costs associated 
with environmental contamination and the potential loss of 
ecosystem services.194 Similarly, there are concerns that 
emergency management plans are lacking and that worst case 
scenarios have not been sufficiently elaborated, in light of federal 
exemptions.195 Moreover, many hold that the DEC inadequately 
considered the findings and conclusions of regulators from other 
states that have experienced harms from horizontal drilling and 
high-volume hydraulic fracturing.196 There is widespread concern 
that the DEC has not ensured there will be full, public disclosure of 
chemical components in fracking fluid, and some urge public 
reporting requirements for frack fluid components, all locations of 
                                                          
14,000 Marcellus Shale Comments – Environmental Inspectors Down to 16, 
D.C. BUREAU (Apr. 29, 2010), http://dcbureau.org/20100429367/Natural-
Resources-News-Service/new-york-dec-staff-shorthanded-to-reply-to-13500-
marcellus-shale-comments-environmental-inspectors-down-to-16.html. 
190 See Riverkeeper Comments, supra note 187; Riha et al., Comments, 
supra note 49; DEP Comments, supra note 187. 
191 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 6-141 to -143. 
192 Riha et al., supra note 49. See also DEP Comments, supra note 187, at 
7; Riverkeeper Comments, supra note 187. 
193 See Riverkeeper Comments, supra note 187; Riha et al., Comments, 
supra note 49; DEP Comments, supra note 187, at 9. 
194 See Riverkeeper Comments, supra note 187; Riha et al., Comments, 
supra note 49; DEP Comments, supra note 187, at 39. 
195 DEP Comments, supra note 187, at 48. 
196 Id. at 1; see also Riverkeeper Comments, supra note 187. 
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drilling operations, and any spills or contamination.197 Overall, the 
SGEIS leaves concern that once hydrofracking kicks into high 
gear, the State will not be poised to address problems that arise. 
Addressing emergencies and incidental effects will be largely left 
to localities, which bear the most risk of immediate harms from 
hydrofracking.  
C. Local Roles 
As a home rule state, New York typically allows municipalities 
a degree of latitude to govern local activities.198 However, Article 
23 stipulates that the State’s regulatory program “supersede[s] all 
local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas 
and solution mining industries” although local primacy over road 
use and property taxes are retained.199 For instance, the State will 
not require local approval of permits under its State Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) and corollary Stormwater 
Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) program.200 Thus, localities 
will not have control over such critical decisions as wellpad siting, 
stormwater planning, erosion control, or pipeline placement.201 The 
State has issued nonbinding directives to industry to consult with 
local planning documents and procedures in siting decisions, and 
operators are expected to comply with local floodplain permitting 
                                                          
197 Riha et al., Comments, supra note 49; see also About the DEC 
Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS), N.Y. CITY 
DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/news/natural_ 
gas_drilling_SGEIS.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (“[T]he City urged DEC 
to rescind the draft SGEIS given the serious omissions and the grave 
consequences of the proposed action.”). 
198 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 1 et. seq. (McKinney 2010). 
199 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION LAW § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2010); 
Michael E. Kenneally & Todd M. Mathes, Natural Gas Production and 
Municipal Home Rule in New York, 10 N.Y. ZONING L. & PRACTICE REP., no. 4, 
2010 at 2, available at http://counties.cce.cornell.edu/yates/documents/Natural 
GasProduction.pdf. 
200 Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
201 See generally Stormwater, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8468.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011); SGEIS, 
supra note 29, at 1-2; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
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requirements that establish broadly applicable siting and setback 
guidelines.202 However, localities cannot set any laws or 
regulations that specifically refer to or are clearly directed at 
hydrofracking activities.203 Thus, hydrofracking is not subject to 
zoning restrictions, although zoning has long been considered a 
valid exercise of local authority.204 Localities are nonetheless 
expected to investigate water quality complaints205 and provide 
emergency response services.206 Waste disposal and sanitation are 
also typically local responsibilities, which will be dramatically 
impacted by the high volume of flowback water, waste, and drill 
                                                          
202 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 8-5; Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra 
note 72. Some county officials are lobbying the state to allow local influence, if 
not control, over issues such as gathering and pipeline siting and stormwater 
plans. Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
203 See SGEIS, supra note 29, at 1-2; Keneally & Mathes, supra note 199 
(explaining that New York case law suggests municipalities may not explicitly 
target natural gas production with zoning, but also arguing that it is possible that 
a carefully enacted ordinance could meet court approval). 
204 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Interview with Elaine 
Jardine, supra note 72. A court might uphold a zoning ordinance limiting 
hydrofracking if an area has a comprehensive plan in place, and has specifically 
and historically rejected similar activities on grounds a court would find 
reasonable. The town of Ulysses in Tompkins County is attempting this 
approach. See Liz Lawyer, Ulysses Explores Gas-Drilling Ban, 
PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Oct. 28, 2010, 8:10 PM), http://www.pressconnects. 
com/article/20101028/NEWS01/10280445/Ulysses+explores+gas-drilling+ban. 
However, a regional or municipal plan targeted towards a specific industrial use 
might be rejected as impermissible NIMBYism. See Michael Burger, “It’s Not 
Easy Being Green”: Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market 
Participant Exception, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835, 886–89 (discussing NIMBYism, 
LULUs, and “spot zoning” in light of municipal attempts to zone out liquefied 
natural gas storage facilities). In addition, in this context zoning provides a 
limited tool, as most fracking will occur in rural, rather than municipal areas. 
Finally, if zoning restrictions are not enacted before hydrofracking begins, the 
activity could constitute a preexisting nonconforming use. 
205 SGEIS, supra note 29, at 8-4 to -5. 
206 See EDWARD VANDEMARK, TIOGA COUNTY COUNCIL OF 
GOVERNMENTS, OVERVIEW OF TIOGA COUNTY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 12–14 
(2009), available at http://www.tiogacountyny.com/pdfs/government/govtover 
view.pdf (setting forth and describing the basic services provided at the county 
level); Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71. 
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cuttings from hydrofracking operations.207 Despite the significant 
emergency responsibilities and infrastructural demands 
hydrofracking poses, localities have few authoritative tools to help 
them prepare.208 
1. Local Responses 
Many local officials in communities where hydrofracking 
activity is likely to occur have been attempting to prepare for its 
probable impacts.209 Several officials in gas-rich Tioga County, an 
area likely to see extensive hydrofracking activity, have expressed 
frustration with their limited ability to influence the course of 
drilling or its effects.210 In particular, some are frustrated by the 
fact that local discretion has been removed from activities typically 
subject to local input, such as permitting for construction and 
industrial activities.211 Others are less concerned about the State’s 
primacy, do not feel lack of federal oversight is an issue of 
concern, and downplay fears over some of hydrofracking’s risks.212 
While some are concerned to an extent about threats to the 
environment and public health, few feel it is within his or her 
authority to take a position on whether hydrofracking should be 
encouraged or prevented.213 Most see the value in compromise, 
                                                          
207 See VANDEMARK, supra note 206, at 41 (setting forth and describing 
basic services provided at the county level); Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra 
note 72; Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
208 See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
209 See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
210 Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
211 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70. In particular, Wendy Walsh is concerned about 
the potential for erosion from wellpad activities and gathering line siting and 
notes that although she typically has input in the permitting process for 
construction activities, she does not in the hydrofracking context. She hopes that 
gas companies will be responsive to local requests about siting. Telephone 
Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
212 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71 (stating his 
“biggest worry is that we’ll run out of freshwater” and opining that truck traffic 
will be the most formidable problem localities will face). 
213 Id.; Interview with Andrew Fagan, Dir., Cornell Cooperative Extension 
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given the contentious nature of hydrofracking and its perceived 
inevitability.214 Understandably, local officials are interested in 
achieving pragmatic solutions with what little regulatory authority 
they have.215 Several seem persuaded that, as heavy users of 
natural gas, New Yorkers have an obligation to permit drilling.216 
Furthermore, local officials recognize the State’s interest in 
encouraging gas production and understand the rationale behind 
cutting off local input and control.217 Opposition at the local level 
could allow a few individuals to stall or prevent fracking, which 
would be undesirable and unacceptable218 given the many interests 
in favor of drilling and the benefits that would come from gas 
production—even if local opposition could provide a bulwark 
against hydrofracking’s harms. 
                                                          
for Chemung and Tioga Counties, NY (Oct. 15, 2010); Interview with Elaine 
Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70; 
Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
214 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71; Interview with 
Andrew Fagan, supra note 213; Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72 
(stating “I can’t say whether it’s good or bad. That’s not my role. My role is to 
prepare the municipalities for the impact that it will have with the constraints 
they’re given by New York State government.”); Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70 (expressing the common sentiment that people in 
Tioga County “don’t want to scare companies away” and that “the DEC is 
already perceived as “overregulating”); Telephone Interview with Wendy 
Walsh, supra note 68. 
215 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71; Interview with 
Andrew Fagan, supra note 213; Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; 
Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70; Telephone Interview 
with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
216 Interview with Andrew Fagan, supra note 213; Interview with Elaine 
Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
217 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
218 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72 (explaining “[i]n defense 
of the state, they don’t want every gas drill to have to go through local 
permitting. They know that local permitting is a difficult process here if it’s a 
controversial use. It’s really hard to get anything through.”); Telephone 
Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
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2. Mitigating Impacts from Hydrofracking 
Some officials in Tioga County seek to mitigate impacts from 
hydrofracking through traditional means of municipal control.219 
While a few towns and villages in New York State are testing their 
zoning discretion,220 this power is less relevant in Tioga County, 
where most towns and villages do not have comprehensive zoning 
plans in place.221 Therefore, concerned county officials have 
focused instead on tweaking traffic rules and on implementing 
light, noise, and wellhead protection ordinances, which restrict 
uses and set water quality standards within municipal borders.222 
Localities may also require ancillary service providers or 
businesses, such as pipe yards and chemical storage facilities, to 
comply with standards for lighting, traffic flow, and signage under 
site plan review ordinances—although site plan review does not 
apply to drilling or hydraulic fracturing processes themselves.223 
It is important to note the limitations of these regulatory tools. 
In Tioga County, for example, while twelve of the fifteen towns 
and villages do now have site plan review ordinances in place, only 
four have enacted zoning regulations.224 The majority of towns 
have not enacted new ordinances in anticipation of hydrofracking 
besides site plan review, and enacting these measures would not 
ultimately be feasible.225 Zoning plans require staff and expertise 
to formulate, while noise and light ordinances and traffic plans 
require prohibitively expensive environmental testing and 
                                                          
219 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71; Interview with 
Andrew Fagan, supra note 213; Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; 
Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70; Telephone Interview 
with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
220 See Lawyer, supra note 204. 
221 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
222 Wellhead protection ordinances set forth general land-use guidelines 
and setbacks that are intended to protect a municipal water supply from 
contamination. Id.; Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
223 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
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engineering consultants.226 In addition, wellhead protection plans 
do not apply where a town lacks a public water supply and are not 
applicable to wellpad activity.227  
There are also political obstacles to implementing new 
measures.228 Many towns and villages have only part-time or 
volunteer officials without the institutional capacity or political 
will to enact new ordinances.229 Furthermore, there is frequently 
opposition to measures that appear to increase governmental 
interference with private property rights, even in protective 
ways.230 In addition, county legislators have proven to be unwilling 
to address fears about hydrofracking given uncertainty over 
practical issues,231 such as whether groundwater contamination is a 
serious concern. The county is also suffering from “personnel 
drain,” as some of the best-trained and most knowledgeable 
workers are hired by industry in anticipation of drilling.232 
Furthermore, the State has not provided supplemental resources to 
help localities prepare, nor has it indicated it will do so once 
fracking begins in earnest.233 
Perhaps the most crucial tool localities lack is adequate 
                                                          
226 Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. One local 
engineering firm has put together a package that would help municipalities get 
reimbursed for wear and tear on roads. Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 
72.  
227 Id. 
228 Id.; Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
229 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
230 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
231 For instance, one looming issue concerns how long it will take the State 
to finalize its regulatory scheme. Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
Note too that many politicians, as landowners, do or will have personal 
economic interest in encouraging hydrofracking. Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
232 Interview with Andrew Fagan, supra note 213; Interview with Elaine 
Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
233 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
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enforcement ability.234 Towns and villages do not have the 
necessary financial resources to conduct adequate oversight or 
ensure that violations of local laws are addressed.235 By contrast, 
energy companies generally have more than sufficient resources to 
pay small fines, which are therefore not likely to deter behavior 
that results in harm.236 Energy companies also tend to have 
significant legal resources readily available to challenge town 
enforcement attempts or to counter opposition.237  
Aware of their disproportionate resources, localities have 
facilitated relationships with industry and sought voluntary 
agreements in which they seek commitments for infrastructure 
investments.238 For instance, officials seek promises that industry 
will purchase firefighting equipment;239 build, repave, and 
                                                          
234 Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
235 Id. 
236 See, e.g., Christopher Helman, Range Resources is King of the 
Marcellus Shale, FORBES.COM (July 22, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.forbes. 
com/forbes/2010/0809/companies-energy-range-resources-bp-gas-blowout-
beneficiary.html (describing the $500 million dollar operating income of just 
one “small” gas company active in the East, Range Resources); see also Donald 
Gilliland, Marcellus Shale Gas Drillers Committed 1,435 Violations in 2.5 
Years, Report Says, PENNLIVE.COM (Aug. 2, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://www. 
pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/08/marcellus_shale_gas_drillers_c.html 
(reporting that gas industry averaged one and a half regulatory violations a day 
over two and a half year period); Drilling Down, supra note 74 (describing how 
energy companies in Pennsylvania have engaged in illegal dumping of fracking 
wastes because it is cheaper than proper disposal where resulting fines are 
dwarfed by the daily profits reaped from gas production). 
237 See Helman, supra note 236; Gilliland, supra note 236; Welcome to the 
Marcellus Drilling Resource Page, PENN. SIERRA CLUB, http://pennsylvania. 
sierraclub.org/PA_Chapter_2008/Conservation/Energy/MarcellusDrillingResour
cePage.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (noting that Pennsylvania towns have 
been tied up in legal battles in attempts to get gas companies to comply with 
local laws). 
238 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71; Interview with 
Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra 
note 70; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
239 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71; Interview with 
Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
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maintain roads;240 use closed systems to store fracking fluid;241 and 
disclose the chemicals used in fracking mixtures.242 In one striking 
example, the Tioga County Emergency Management Office will 
rely solely on industry to extinguish any wellpad fires.243 In 
addition to realizing that basic needs will be better met if they 
work with private industry, local officials are interested in 
fostering positive and cooperative relationships with firms 
operating in and among their communities.244 
IV. HYDROFRACKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 
New York’s experience with hydrofracking illustrates how an 
adaptive approach to regulation is more likely to result in sufficient 
environmental protection than an approach that attempts to match 
potential problems with a level of authority based on geography. 
While an essentially localized activity, hydrofracking nonetheless 
presents a regulatory challenge to state and local governments.245 
Deciding whether to encourage or limit hydrofracking requires a 
highly subjective analysis that relies on uncertain and incomplete 
                                                          
240 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra 
note 68. 
241 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra 
note 68. 
242 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71; Telephone 
Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
243 Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 71. 
244 Id.; Interview with Andrew Fagan, supra note 213; Interview with 
Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra 
note 70; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. Of course, 
there are concerns about whether these agreements will satisfactorily address 
localities’ needs in actuality, and these agreements can give rise to 
disagreements between energy companies and localities over how best to 
implement them. For example, although energy companies and towns share an 
interest in having roads maintained in good quality, thus operators may agree to 
provide resources to accomplish this task, they may resist doing so in a manner 
that meets local desires or conventions—or even labor laws. Telephone 
Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
245 See supra Part III. 
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information about risk.246 Meanwhile, state and local 
decisionmakers are incentivized to accept risk of harms they lack 
resources to prevent or mitigate.247 Applying federal laws to 
hydrofracking would help relieve some of the pressures on state 
and local authorities by placing the burden of precaution onto 
energy companies.248 Moreover, there may be appreciable benefits 
to fostering a flexible regime that includes responsive interaction 
among all three levels of government.249 Finally, an active federal 
role in regulating new technologies like hydrofracking can give 
states and localities a better chance to formulate policies aligned 
with their resources and expertise, leading to increased political 
accountability, jurisdictional confidence, and fewer regulatory 
commons problems.250 
A. Strict State Primacy: A Poor Match for Hydrofracking 
In many respects, the existing federal approach to regulation of 
hydrofracking would likely meet the approval of matching 
principal proponents. A land-based activity without any obvious 
interstate impacts, hydrofracking seems a good candidate for a 
state-led approach, and the federal government essentially has 
mandated state primacy.251 Federal regulation would increase costs 
and slow fracking efforts.252 If federal laws were operative, 
                                                          
246 See supra Part I.C. 
247 An example is contamination of an entire county’s drinking water 
source, as in Tioga County, where the Clinton Street Ballpark Aquifer supplies 
both Tioga and neighboring Broome County. See Clinton Street-Ballpark Valley 
Aquifer System Broome and Tioga County Areas, NY, 50 Fed. Reg. 2025 
(Envtl. Prot. Agency Jan. 14, 1985) (final determination). See also infra Part 
III.C. 
248 See infra Part IV.B–C. 
249 See infra Part IV.B–C. 
250 See infra Part IV.C. 
251 See supra Part III.C; see also Wiseman, supra note 4, at 251 n.125. 
252 Adler, supra note 128, at 157–60 (arguing that SDWA is an example of 
inefficient regulation because it makes a poor jurisdictional match); see also 
Butler & Macey, supra note 18, at 62 (arguing that “[b]ecause land pollution 
and the potential for groundwater contamination are very localized phenomena, 
our federalism model leads to the argument that these externalities should be 
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industry, states, and localities would bear additional SDWA 
compliance burdens.253 Energy companies would have to comply 
with and obtain permits under the CWA, which are costly and 
delay development. Aggregation of emissions from wellpad 
activity or truck traffic under the CAA would increase permitting 
and cause companies to incur pollution control costs. Removal of 
exemption from CERCLA would increase risk of liability that 
would create disincentives to drill, and strengthened NEPA review 
would also add time and cost to preproduction planning. 
Regulation under RCRA would also add time and expense to 
disposal of fracking byproducts. Moreover, and especially given 
the extensive private property interests involved in hydrofracking, 
local geographic, socioeconomic, geological, and hydrological 
differences make state regulation arguably more appropriate than 
federal regulation to meet unique state preferences.254  
However, an analysis of New York’s experience with 
hydrofracking to date suggests that state primacy may well result 
in underprotection and even hamper production activity.255 
Notably, New York’s proposed regulations are more protective 
than those in many other states,256 yet its plan nonetheless has 
demonstrated weaknesses.257 New York’s inadequate enforcement 
and oversight capacity and its failure to anticipate cumulative 
impacts may mean that state primacy will result in unintended and 
undesirable outcomes.258 
First, it is important to note that New York’s regulations may 
not result in protection of some baseline standards that EPA has 
established.259 For instance, concentrations of toxic pollutants in 
flowback hydrofracking fluids have measured in excess of amounts 
                                                          
regulated exclusively by state and local jurisdictions”). 
253 Adler, supra note 128, at 157–60. 
254 See supra Part I.C. 
255 See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
256 See generally Wiseman, supra note 4 (comparing multiple state regimes 
and describing New York’s proposed regulation as comparatively more 
protective than other states). 
257 See supra Part III.B. 
258 See supra Part III.B. 
259 Wiseman, supra note 4, at 277. 
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that would be permissible under the SDWA, and flowback fluids 
can be high in pollutants ruled hazardous under RCRA.260 Because 
New York State has not updated its wetland map after pivotal 
Supreme Court decisions that altered federal jurisdiction over 
wetlands,261 there may be pollutant releases onto what should be 
federally regulated land.262 New York’s ability to achieve water 
quality standards under the CWA may be seriously overestimated 
in light of criticism that the State has not accurately estimated the 
extent of cumulative impacts on water quality.263 Air emissions 
from wellpad activities, if aggregated, might far exceed the 
minimum requirements that trigger the CAA.264 These examples 
demonstrate that New York’s scheme might result in failure to 
meet federal standards that would apply absent exemptions or do 
apply to the same or similar harms caused by other industries and 
suggest that as a threshold matter, state primacy over 
hydrofracking will create results inconsistent with existing law. 
Furthermore, the New York scheme’s reliance on local 
implementation of emergency planning, public health, waste 
disposal, and road regulation enhances the probability that 
unintended harms may occur. The level of risk that localities are 
expected to bear is disproportionate to the resources they have to 
handle that risk.265 As a result, the State’s regulatory regime is 
                                                          
260 See id at 277–78. 
261 See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (invalidating the “migratory bird rule” and 
holding that the Army Corps does not have jurisdiction over wetlands not 
directly adjacent to navigable waters); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 
(2006) (plurality holding that federal jurisdiction extends only to navigable 
waterways and water bodies with continuous surface connection with navigable 
waterways, as well as to wetlands adjacent to these waters). See also supra note 
168 and accompanying text. 
262 See Riha et al., Comments, supra note 49. 
263 See Drilling Down, supra note 74 (examining how processed 
wastewater from hydrofracking may result in water body quality below that 
required by federal standards). 
264 See Ian Urbina, Pressure Limits Efforts to Police Drilling for Gas, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 3, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
03/04/us/04gas.html?_r=1&ref=science. 
265 See supra Part III.C.  
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effectively dependent on voluntary industry action.266 Local 
officials hope energy companies will agree to provide necessary 
infrastructure—like roads—and emergency response support—like 
basic firefighting equipment—even though the industry has 
incentives to downplay and minimize concerns to the detriment of 
preparedness.267 Moreover, experiences of local officials show that 
localities do not feel well equipped to handle even routine 
incidental, let alone catastrophic, impacts from fracking and that 
they lack reliable information to help them bargain with energy 
companies optimally.268 
Lack of oversight and enforcement powers at state and local 
levels may lead to lax, inconsistent, or insufficient compliance 
with existing state and local regulations.269 Even where officials 
are dedicated to proactive prevention and oversight efforts, local 
                                                          
266 See supra Part III.C; see infra note 267. 
267 As Elaine Jardine explained: 
I’d really like to get into meeting with more [gas companies]. Because 
they don’t necessarily have to comply with [wellhead protection 
ordinances] . . . . We really want to establish some kind of relationship 
with the gas companies so they may decide to comply with a municipal 
wellhead protection ordinance [and] we would like to see some of these 
critical things that are needed in the community followed, too—like if a 
fire station needs to have a ladder truck, none of our fire stations have 
ladder trucks—so you know have the gas company pay for that, and 
community benefit type things. 
Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
268 According to Elaine Jardine:  
I don’t get much support from the legislature. It’s a combination of 
funding, it’s not believing in planning—and they just don’t want to 
tackle the issue of natural gas right now . . . .  [And the planning 
department] will be the main point of contact for gas industries’ dealing 
with the municipalities and we’re trying to set that up now . . . The 
associate planner I used to have went to Chesapeake [Energy] to be a 
municipal relations person. 
Id. As Andrew Fagan put it: “[n]ational and international companies–they’re so 
excited about this play and they’re saying it’s the second largest in the world, 
but are we ready for it? Are we ready for these companies to descend upon us, 
and can we trust them?” Interview with Andrew Fagan, supra note 213. See 
supra Parts III.C–D. 
269 See supra Part III.C. 
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staffs are inadequate to conduct inspections that would ensure that 
companies—who may be unfamiliar with desired or mandated 
local practices, given variation from town to town—are heeding 
regulations and ordinances.270 If noncompliance is detected, local 
enforcement power does not appear sufficient to induce adherence 
to laws.271 Furthermore, at the state level, an insufficient number of 
wellpad inspectors can lead to severely reduced checks on drilling 
and production activities, which may make it more likely that 
harm-generating errors will occur.272 If harm does occur, lack of 
oversight may make identification of the responsible party 
difficult, given the number of component processes that make up 
hydrofracking.273 
New York’s experience also illustrates some of the difficulty of 
drawing jurisdictional lines around complicated environmental 
problems that have corollary economic benefits. New York is 
proceeding to set its jurisdictional lines by declaring what 
hydrofracking’s impacts are likely to be, by establishing permitting 
and policy standards in its SGEIS to respond to these impacts, and 
by restricting local authority.274 Yet the defects in New York’s 
                                                          
270 Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra note 68. 
271 As Judith Quigley explained, “if there is a disagreement over something, 
gas companies are the ones with deep pockets . . . and of course companies will 
battle if [an issue] goes to court,” while towns and villages simply do not have 
money in the coffers or legal staff to fight any opposition. Telephone Interview 
with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. Furthermore, as Andrew Fagan explained, 
“[i]f it is just a gentlemen’s agreement, where [companies] just agree to a 
checklist, and there’s no punitive actions that will happen, then we have to be 
ready for the consequences.” Interview with Andrew Fagan, supra note 213. 
272 See Marie C. Baca, Interview: Former Environmental Commissioner 
Pete Grannis on Gas Drilling, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 12, 2010, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/interview-former-ny-environmental-
commissioner-pete-grannis-on-gas-drilling. 
273 The presence of a series of subcontractor relationships can complicate 
the process of identifying the responsible party in a spill or disaster. See, e.g., 
the controversy over whether British Petroleum, TransOcean, or Halliburton 
could be held accountable for the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico of the spring 
and summer of 2010.  See Erika Boldstad, BP, Transocean, Halliburton Will 
Blame One Another for Spill, MCCLATCHY (May 10, 2010), http://www. 
mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/10/93868/bp-transocean-halliburton-will.html. 
274 See supra Parts III.B–C. 
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proposed scheme suggest that state regulators have downplayed or 
failed to anticipate fully the gravity of uncertain impacts, which 
has led to inaccurate characterization of problems and poor 
allocation of authority.275 Furthermore, because DEC regulators 
are not responsible for the kinds of issues that first responders at 
the local level face, such as waste disposal, road degradation, 
emergency response, or even local air quality, problems within the 
jurisdiction of localities are likely to prove beyond any local 
regulator’s control or resources to address.276 Moreover, the 
uncertainty over whether hydrofracking should be viewed as 
presenting problems rather than opportunities has fostered 
ambivalence that colors local elected officials’ willingness to cast 
hydrofracking as a policy priority.277 Thus, many of the attempts to 
address potential harms have been initiated by unelected officials 
who are concerned about harm and feel they should prepare now in 
order to help forestall foreseeable problems.278 Unelected local 
officials effectively are left with a Hobson’s choice—they can 
either curry favor with energy companies and establish voluntary 
agreements and risk considerable harm, or push the boundaries of 
what might be permitted by law, such as attempting to zone out 
hydrofracking, only to find they have overstepped their power and 
in the process have alienated and lost the ability to work with and 
extract concessions from gas producers.279 In addition, confusion 
about jurisdiction with regard to foreseeable harms may lead local 
decisionmakers to be even more reluctant to grapple with 
                                                          
275 See supra Part III.B. 
276 See supra Part III.C; Drilling Down, supra note 74. 
277 See supra Part III.C. Local legislators have not been focused on 
devising plans to prepare for fracking “saying it’s not here yet and we don’t 
know how long it’s going to take.” Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
278 See supra Part III.C. 
279 As Andrew Fagan explained: 
I think the tricky part, for anyone looking at [hydrofracking], is - okay 
who has jurisdiction over what piece of this [issue], and what is this 
piece anyway? How are [we] supposed to stay on top of this? What’s 
the responsibility of towns? What’s the responsibility of counties? 
What’s the responsibility of individuals? 
Interview with Andrew Fagan, supra note 213. 
POWERS - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:18 PM 
 Fracking and Federalism 959 
unforeseeable and novel problems that arise.280 Drawing strict 
jurisdictional boundaries around an environmental issue without 
fully addressing the scope of possible problems or recognizing the 
asymmetry between local and industry resources creates a danger 
that the drawn boundaries will prove arbitrary or fail to account for 
the broad scope of consequent harms. Thus, setting strict 
jurisdictional lines—especially where, as here, there is pressure to 
underregulate281—might leave designated regulators unprepared, 
while responsibility for handling many intractable problems will be 
pushed off onto those who are not politically accountable.282  
Besides the potential for environmental and public health 
harms, New York’s experience with hydrofracking suggests that 
even apparently well-matched jurisdiction can hamper economic 
growth. Fear that New York’s regulations are inadequate in light of 
federal exemptions, combined with widely publicized accounts of 
hydrofracking’s harms, has led to a high level of opposition from 
some groups.283 Vocal opposition has delayed the release of final 
                                                          
280 Id. 
281 Both from the energy industry and interested property owners. See 
supra Part II.C. In addition, we might presume the pressures that typically have 
been seen to drive state regulators are operative here. For discussion of these 
forces, see Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 16, at 120–22; 
Facts Are Stubborn Things, supra note 122; State Environmental Standard-
Setting, supra note 122. 
282 Elaine Jardine expressed this point:  
We need that natural gas as a nation and as consumers, so I can see 
both sides. It’s a two-edged sword. The impact is [going to be major] 
because of all of the incidental impacts [but if] farmers get good 
payment so the farm will most likely stay in farming . . . I see it from 
both sides of the coin. It’s just a wait and see game I guess. We can’t 
do much about it. 
Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; see also Baca, supra note 272 
(quoting former DEC Commissioner Grannis as understanding “both sides” of 
the issue and discussing the DEC’s dual mandate of environmental protection 
and promoting gas and oil exploitation).  
283 Some of the most vocal opposition to hydrofracking has coalesced 
around the documentary Gasland, which won an award for best documentary at 
the Sundance Film Festival and was nominated for an Academy Award, and 
chronicles the experience of landowners and neighbors of hydrofracking 
activity. See About the Film, GASLAND: A FILM BY JOSH FOX, http://gasland 
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regulations in New York284 and may result in an outright ban if 
sufficient public opposition is sustained or continues to grow.285 
Even if New York proceeds to set regulations and allows 
hydrofracking to commence, its insufficient oversight capacity is 
likely to limit the extent of production, as DEC’s current strategy is 
to issue permits only in proportion to oversight capacity.286 Thus, 
hydrofracking shows that the matching principle can lead to 
                                                          
themovie.com/about-the-film/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2011); see also Charles 
Riley, ‘Gasland’ Oscar Nod Draws Industry Ire, CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 26, 
2011, 5:21 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/26/news/companies/gasland_ 
movie/index.htm. 
284 See Sickle, supra note 189. 
285 See Comments by N.Y. Gov. David Paterson (WAMC radio broadcast 
Nov. 24, 2010) (“At this point, I would say that the hydrofracking opponents 
have raised enough of an argument to thwart us going forward at this time.”). 
Former Gov. Paterson also issued an executive order suspending the approval of 
some permits until after July 2011, although the efficacy of this order is doubtful 
given that permits will not be issued before DEC completes its review of 
hydrofracking, not expected to occur before the order ceases to have effect. 
Sasha Chavkin, Executive Order Suspending Fracking Brings Little Change, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 17, 2010, 1:23 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/ 
executive-order-suspending-fracking-brings-little-change. Of course, New 
York’s experience may not be representative of how the hydrofracking debate 
will play out in the rest of the country. Downstate residents are concerned 
primarily with protecting their water supply and can be out of touch with the 
kinds of problems communities upstate face that make them amenable to 
hydrofracking. See, e.g., Eric Engquist, The New Gold Rush, CRAIN’S, (Nov. 9, 
2009, 5:59 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20091101/SMALLBIZ/ 
311019959# (contrasting opposition to hydrofracking by Mayor Bloomberg and 
organized NYC residents with benefits from hydrofracking accrued to upstate 
residents). It may be unlikely that public opposition will grow significant 
enough to stanch hydrofracking activity in other states that do not have such a 
polarized makeup. 
286 In an interview, former Commissioner of the DEC, Pete Grannis 
explained:  
The human resources have to be scaled based on [] drilling activity. 
The plan [when we were drafting the SGEIS] was to have on-site 
monitors . . . . The DEC will make sure [there are staff] on hand to 
make sure that the process is functioning properly. It’s no good to [just] 
give a permit . . . [y]ou need people on site who are not answerable to 
the driller.  
Baca, supra note 272.  
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apparent inefficiency, by its own terms. 
B. An Adaptive Approach to Environmental Federalism  
Hydrofracking demonstrates the desirability of an adaptive 
approach to environmental federalism that includes an active role 
for the federal government and regulatory flexibility both within 
applicable federal agencies and between state and local actors to 
respond to changing information and circumstances. The network 
of federal environmental laws is critical to prevent and check 
harms from environmental problems that might immediately seem 
to have only localized effects.287 Each environmental law is 
designed to allocate burdens of risk and precaution differently and 
to place those burdens onto industry, localities, states, and the 
federal government in nuanced ways.288 Layers of accountability, 
liability, and penalty institute procedural nodes that incentivize 
industry actors to act with greater precaution where they propose to 
engage in risky activity. Greater precaution would undoubtedly 
lead to a reduced risk of harm, and could mollify opposition that 
stands as an obstacle to production in the face of uncertainty. Thus, 
while federal laws might impose upfront and ongoing compliance 
costs for energy companies seeking to exploit the Marcellus Shale 
in New York, their application would likely lead to more 
satisfactory outcomes for a larger number of stakeholders. 
One criticism of federal environmental laws that adaptive 
federalism addresses is that federal regulation suffers from path 
dependence and poor responsiveness to local concerns and 
conditions.289 To some extent, hydrofracking proves these 
criticisms have merit. For example, the way the EPA currently 
                                                          
287 See supra Part III.A. 
288 See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 72–78 (describing the design 
of environmental laws and how functions, enforcement, and risk and burden 
allocation vary); Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism, supra note 19, 
at 178–83 (arguing that federal regulation provides valuable checks that provide 
a better safety net within the context of environmental problems). 
289 Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 17, at 1595 (noting that “the first 
significant regulatory action on an issue may sit unrevised for years, long after 
the state of the art has changed”). 
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defines a “stationary source” under the CAA leaves hydrofracking 
operations just out of regulatory range.290 Of course, the EPA has 
been vested with the discretion to exercise considerable regulatory 
flexibility to change how it defines terms, such as what constitutes 
a “stationary source,”291 in order to respond to evolving problems. 
However, under an adaptive approach to federalism, some path 
dependence is not detrimental to the objective of environmental 
protection; rather, a degree of overarching rigidity can provide 
structure.292 Applying federal laws in a consistent manner across 
industries—rather than based on arbitrary exemptions—would 
provide the regulatory system with greater stability, even as 
regulators strive to increase their capacity to respond to evolving 
circumstances. 
Hydrofracking illustrates how regulators may use information 
to increase their responsiveness to local conditions and improve 
the adaptability of the federal environmental law framework. 
Because the EPA has been essentially directed to leave the field,293 
community groups, localities, and states have been compelled to 
gather and generate information about harm and problem-solving 
strategies and to disseminate this information across state lines.294 
                                                          
290 See supra Part III.A.  
291 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (setting forth what has become the Chevron test, highly deferential to 
agency interpretations of ambiguous terms in enabling statutes).  
292 Adaptive Federalism, supra note 16.  
293 Note, however, that Congress has directed EPA to study hydrofracking 
more closely, which the agency has begun to do, releasing a draft study plan on 
February 8, 2011. See Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. EPA, http://water.epa.gov/ 
type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 12, 
2011).  
294 See, e.g., Lastest News, CATSKILL MOUNTAINKEEPER.ORG, http://www. 
catskillmountainkeeper.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (listing stories of 
interest about impacts from hydrofracking nationwide); Natural Gas 
Hydrofracking in Shale, CITIZENS CAMPAIGN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, 
http://www.citizenscampaign.org/campaigns/hydro-fracking.asp (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2011) (providing access to stories and information about hydrofracking 
nationwide); Landman Report Card, LANDMANREPORTCARD.ORG (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2011) (providing a place for landowners approached by landmen to 
report their experiences); Marcellus Drilling News, MARCELLUSDRILLING.COM, 
http://marcellusdrilling.com/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (a pro-drilling website 
POWERS - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:18 PM 
 Fracking and Federalism 963 
For instance, much of the information that the Tioga County 
Attorney has been using to develop a model voluntary road use 
agreement was obtained by the attorney from neighboring Broome 
County, who, faced with a local information deficit, traveled to 
Texas to obtain information about the kinds of issues that have 
arisen there due to gas production.295 However, information 
applicable to one state or region does not always translate well to 
another.296 Furthermore, information that has been publicly 
compiled in an ad hoc manner might not be reliable, with a good 
proportion subject to interest-group and media distortions.297 
                                                          
posting positive articles about hydrofracking and alerts about efforts to limit or 
ban the practice). There are many more such community-operated websites and 
blogs, as well as more journalistic efforts, like ProPublica’s investigative reports 
on hydrofracking trends nationwide. See supra notes 63 & 64. In terms of the 
kind of general information generation that has occurred, and how unruly it can 
be, note that as of February 27, 2011, an Internet search for “hydraulic 
fracturing” and “New York” turned up 155,000 search results. Hydraulic 
Fracturing New York, GOOGLE, http://google.com (search “hydraulic fracturing 
new york”) (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). To see how EPA is likely better situated 
to aggregate and analyze information about hydrofracking, see Drilling Down, 
supra note 74 (comparing state information and data on water contamination 
with internal EPA documents that provide a fuller picture of hydrofracking’s 
harms to water bodies). 
295 Telephone Interview with Judith Quigley, supra note 70. 
296 Hydrofracking effects are likely to differ across states depending on 
hydrology and geology (i.e. aquifer depth versus depth of drilling), as well as 
political and economic variation. See LISA SUMI, SHALE GAS: FOCUS ON THE 
MARCELLUS SHALE (2008), http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/OGAP 
MarcellusShaleReport-6-12-08.pdf (discussing drilling or potential for drilling 
in several different shale formations across the country and suggesting how 
differences might lead to different impacts). 
297 Accuracy or validity of either position aside, compare Hydraulic 
Fracturing Facts, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING.COM, http://www.hydraulic 
fracturing.com/Pages/information.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (website that 
appears to be operated by Chesapeake Energy asserting that “[p]roperly 
conducted modern hydraulic fracturing is a safe, sophisticated, highly 
engineered and controlled procedure”) with John Zeiger, No Fracking Way: Ban 
Hydrofracking in New York, ONEARTH.ORG, http://www.onearth.org/node/1865 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (NRDC-published community blog post describing 
SGEIS as “possibly the worst document [the DEC] has ever written” and 
positing that “one could make the argument that it was practically written by gas 
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Indeed, public concern about whether anecdotal harms can be 
traced to hydrofracking has already led the EPA to commence a 
new study of the practice.298 The agency now has the opportunity 
to develop and respond to emerging information in a 
comprehensive fashion, creating a reliable record that addresses 
public fears, as this Note and other authors recommend.299 With 
more reliable information, regulators at all levels of government 
would be better situated to make decisions about whether or how 
to regulate hydrofracking.300 Regulatory flexibility to respond to 
                                                          
company lobbyists”). Note that uncertainty about what harms are likely to occur 
that results from concern over accuracy of publicly available information has 
placed local officials who seek to cultivate objectivity in an awkward position, 
exacerbating their difficulties in preparing for incidental impacts; as Andrew 
Fagan explains: 
When you see movies like Gasland and other things, you need 
some way to view those things through the lens of objectivity if 
you don’t have all the knowledge then you get caught up in the 
emotional . . . . So that’s been a real challenge, and the media 
doesn’t help . . . . And right now we are in a position that we can 
learn from mistakes that are happening in Pennsylvania, [but] in 
Pennsylvania the companies are showing all of these regulations 
they already have to follow, and DEP is happy about how they are 
monitoring things, and how things are going, but yet you hear 
about these number of concerns or issues and you keep trying to 
weigh that out in your mind, and saying “who do you believe?” 
Interview with Andrew Fagan, supra note 213. 
298 The EPA is engaged in producing a report on hydrofracking, to be 
released in 2012. See Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 293. An EPA report 
released in 2004, which concluded that hydrofracking could not be conclusively 
linked to purported harms, has been widely criticized. See generally LISA SUMI, 
OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, OUR DRINKING WATER AT RISK: 
WHAT EPA AND THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY DON’T WANT US TO KNOW 
ABOUT HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (2005), available at http://www.earthworks 
action.org/pubs/DrinkingWaterAtRisk.pdf. 
299 See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic 
Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 182–83 (2009). 
300 Allowing the EPA to play a pivotal role in providing and ensuring 
reliability of information about possible environmental harm can result in 
improved policy choices about new technologies, like hydrofracking, over time. 
Applying existing federal laws would help prevent some of hydrofracking’s 
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unique problems would increase as uncertainty that hinders 
decisionmaking or incentivizes regulators to discount harm is 
lessened.  
Although matching principle proponents would likely argue 
that wholly intrastate municipal drinking water supplies can be 
more appropriately and efficiently regulated at the state or local 
level,301 an adaptive approach to federalism supports the idea that a 
federal environmental law like the SDWA is equally justified as 
those that target clearly interstate resources like air and navigable 
waterways. Analysis of the SDWA shows that applying the 
matching principle and fixing a static regulatory position that 
drinking water is always better left to localities or states can result 
in underprotection. Water resources that states and localities can 
protect most efficiently under “normal” conditions may be left 
vulnerable when a new kind of industry, such as hydrofracking, 
arises that has unprecedented and formerly unforeseeable 
impacts.302 Towns can only use devices like weak wellhead 
protection ordinances to prevent pollution of communal water 
supplies.303 And as in Tioga County, where one aquifer supplies a 
whole county,304 a wellhead protection plan will not forestall 
contamination that occurs outside the borders of the municipality 
that has enacted the plan.305 If the SDWA were to apply to 
hydrofracking, federal enforcement and oversight resources would 
                                                          
most dramatic harms but would not remove jurisdiction from state and local 
regulators. See supra Part III.A. Thus, federal regulators would still be able to 
learn from innovations at lower levels of government and from industry 
responses to different policies. The federal government could consciously devise 
and adopt iterative strategies, finding ways to moderate what industry perceives 
as draconian state postures in some instances, while inhibiting overly permissive 
schemes in other states. See Carlson, supra note 139 (presenting a discussion of 
iterative opportunities created when federal and state regulatory differences are 
played off of one another in the context of vehicle emissions standards).  
301 See Adler, supra note 128, at 157–60. 
302 See Drilling Down, supra note 74. 
303 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
304 Id. See also Clinton Street-Ballpark Valley Aquifer System Broome and 
Tioga County Areas, NY, 50 Fed. Reg. 2025 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Jan. 14, 1985) 
(final determination). 
305 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
POWERS - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:18 PM 
966 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
offer a higher level of assured protection. Not only would the 
federal government carry a bigger stick to ensure compliance, but 
federal intervention would cut out the formidable costs of 
establishing and revisiting baseline standards where the nature of 
novel harms is not well understood.306 Furthermore, forcing energy 
companies to implement technologies that will prevent harm to 
municipal water supplies could have the beneficial impact of 
preventing harm to unregulated water sources, like private wells, 
as industry operating standards improve in order to achieve 
compliance with federal regulations. Hydrofracking shows that 
even federal laws that seem intrusive at the local or state level may 
be necessary to ensure proper protection of critical commonly held 
resources. Thus, allowing federal laws to provide a stable 
framework while increasing responsiveness within that framework 
will lead to better protection. 
C. Avoiding Regulatory Commons Problems 
In addition to demonstrating that an adaptive approach is 
preferable to a matching approach, New York’s experience with 
hydrofracking sheds light on some aspects of operative incentives 
within the regulatory commons. As in New York, states may have 
conflicting regulatory mandates, which result in incentive 
confusion and distortion. For example, the DEC’s goal is to 
promote the maximum extent of exploitation of gas resources 
while protecting correlative rights and the environment—goals that 
are in conflict.307 Giving the states primacy over environmental 
problems while tasking them with striking a balance between 
economic growth and environmental protection may make it less 
likely they will have incentives to include localities in permitting 
and land-use decisions.308 In an atmosphere where there is pressure 
                                                          
306 See e.g., Part III.C. 
307 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 550.1 (2010); About DEC, N.Y. 
ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/24.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2011). For Commissioner Grannis’ perspective on these 
conflicting directives, see Baca, supra note 272. 
308 Especially where there is evidence that state regulators are already more 
growth-oriented than federal regulators to begin with. See Contextual 
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to compromise, states have incentives to stifle legitimate 
opposition; they can easily characterize such opposition as 
“NIMBYism” and dismiss it. For example, in New York, 
meaningful opportunity to express local opposition and participate 
in critical decisions over how hydrofracking will occur is 
foreclosed by the State’s usurpation of traditional zoning power 
and local SPDES and SWPPP permitting processes.309 Contracted 
authority leads to jurisdictional insecurity at the local level; 
meanwhile, the State has not provided adequate mechanisms for 
protection.310 However, if federal law were to apply, the push to 
begin hydrofracking would be slowed dramatically as energy 
companies would be forced to comply with federal permitting 
processes. State and local regulators would have more time and 
more resources to focus on and refine strategies best suited to their 
historic expertise, such as cooperative compliance with the federal 
environmental laws, land use and natural resources planning, and 
municipal zoning.311 Shared regulatory responsibility and a slowed 
pace could help diminish the high stakes atmosphere that currently 
drives New York to stifle meaningful local input, and would lead 
to enhanced deliberation and increased jurisdictional confidence 
overall. 
Finally, the pervasive role of compromise in preference setting 
at the local level suggests that avoiding regulatory commons 
problems involves awareness of differences in risk tolerances 
across the three tiers of government. As is occurring in New York, 
states and localities may be bound to accept higher levels of risk 
than many citizens prefer because the combination of profits and 
harm-prevention strategies that rely on industry skew incentive 
structures and align risk tolerances with industry preferences.312 In 
                                                          
Environmental Federalism, supra note 16, at 120–22. 
309 Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with 
Judith Quigley, supra note 70; Telephone Interview with Wendy Walsh, supra 
note 68. 
310 See supra Part III.B. 
311 See, e.g., supra Part III.A (describing state roles in cooperative 
federalism), and Part III.C (discussing the traditional municipal power to enact 
municipal zoning plans).  
312 As Dick Le Count explained, “we have to come up with solutions; being 
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addition, local actors have little choice but to accept an activity, 
even if they would prefer to keep it out of their environs.313 By 
contrast, regulators at the federal level are more insulated from 
immediate risks of harm, direct benefits, and complicated mixtures 
of the two.314 Thus, federal regulators may be better poised to set 
and enforce baseline standards that can prevent any group or 
community from accepting unacceptably high levels of risk. In 
addition, varying the level of federal oversight according to type of 
activity rather than the type of harms an activity causes—as is 
occurring with hydrofracking—results in inconsistent application 
of laws that adds to jurisdictional confusion.315 
While adding another layer of regulatory authority will 
introduce a new group of actors, with their own incentive 
structures that could arguably add to jurisdictional confusion,316 a 
federal role seems nonetheless necessary to ensure adequate 
protection. Where state and local oversight and enforcement 
resources are not adequate to meet an environmental law 
challenge, a federal role would assure that energy companies 
exercise a minimum level of environmental precaution. Local 
governments would then not be compelled to enter unenforceable 
agreements that result in the same, or likely far less, protection.317 
Local governments could spend their scarce resources on 
initiatives that contribute to the long-term stability of their 
communities rather than on scrambling to prepare or on 
negotiations with energy companies with short-term and myopic 
                                                          
negative and anti-fracking doesn’t help because then we won’t get the help of 
the energy companies.” Telephone Interview with Dick Le Count, supra note 
71. For analysis of dynamics of risk allocation and economies of scale, see 
Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 16, at 121–22. 
313 See Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 16, at 111–12 
(advancing an “economy of scale” argument for federal jurisdiction on the basis 
it is better poised to balance risk tolerances). 
314 See id.  
315 E.g., the exemption of hydrofracking, a construction activity that creates 
a high level of disturbance, from the state SWPPP program seems arbitrary, 
given that local regulators generally have input into permitting of local 
construction activities. 
316 See Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 16, at 126. 
317 See supra Part III.C. 
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interests.318 This outcome seems entirely consistent with the 
purposes of federalism—that responsibilities at each level of 
government are correlated to resources and expectations about 
accountability.319 
Application of federal laws along with state and local 
regulations can also play an important signaling role by setting 
normative priorities.320 These priorities serve to reinforce clarity 
over, and confidence in, regulatory authority to meet novel 
challenges. As in the hydrofracking example, failure to apply 
environmental laws in a consistent fashion decreases regulator 
assurance in jurisdictional authority.321 Because it seems clear that 
the federal government is steadfastly interested in developing 
natural gas resources,322 an increased federal role in the regulation 
of hydrofracking is not likely to result in insurmountable barriers 
to production and may provide legal, conceptual, and normative 
stability that is key to avoiding regulatory commons problems.323 
CONCLUSION 
New York’s attempt to regulate hydrofracking has provided an 
opportunity to scrutinize the appropriateness of various approaches 
to environmental federalism. At first glance, hydrofracking seems 
like an activity that could be best regulated at the state and local 
                                                          
318 Elaine Jardine explained “[Hydrofracking] takes up a good chunk of my 
time.” Interview with Elaine Jardine, supra note 72. 
319 See Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 16, at 128. 
320 See Stewart, supra note 120, at 1210–11. 
321 See supra note 279. 
322 See supra Part III.A (describing extent of Congressional support for 
exemptions for hydraulic fracturing). 
323 See supra Part III.A. The most aggressive Congressional attempt to 
address hydrofracking to date has sought to remove the exemption for hydraulic 
fracturing under the SDWA. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of 
Chemicals Act of 2009, H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009); Fracturing 
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009, S. 1215, 111th Cong. 
(2009). However, neither the House nor the Senate bill made it out of 
committee. See Bill Summary and Status, THOMAS (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.02766: (last visited Apr. 12, 
2011). 
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level, given that its most immediate effects are localized and 
intrastate.324 Therefore, hydrofracking and New York State 
ostensibly make a good regulatory match, as Congress has 
mandated.325 
However, as analysis of New York’s experience shows, 
matching approaches rely on what are perhaps overly simplistic 
assumptions about the roles that risk and uncertainty play in setting 
and satisfying preferences.326 In New York, regulators have been 
required to balance interests that are easy to price and relatively 
certain against those that are difficult to quantify and uncertain; 
further, they have been under pressure to make sensitive decisions 
about important trade-offs quickly.327 With little regulatory 
control, localities have been forced to align their interests with 
industry interests in attempts to assure safety and maximize 
benefits, and then hope for the best.328 Existing state and local laws 
are likely to prove inadequate to prevent or redress harms from 
hydrofracking, should they occur, because oversight and 
enforcement resources are limited.329 In turn, concern over state 
and local capabilities to address harms itself threatens to inhibit gas 
production.330 Thus, hydrofracking in New York suggests that state 
primacy—and thus the matching principle—may not result in 
adequate public and environmental protection or optimal economic 
efficiency.331 
New York’s experience with hydrofracking underscores the 
need for an adaptive framework even with regulatory commons 
risks.332 A federal role will lead to some costs, which include 
initial delays in fracking activity and increased spending to achieve 
compliance with federal laws.333 However, underregulation can 
                                                          
324 See supra Part IV.A. 
325 See supra Part III.A. 
326 See supra Part IV. 
327 See supra Parts II–III. 
328 See supra Part III.C. 
329 See supra Part III.C. 
330 See supra Part IV.A. 
331 See supra Part IV. 
332 See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
333 See supra Part IV.A. 
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lead to unnecessary, tragic, and irreversible costs borne by those 
populations least equipped to bear them.334 A vigorous and 
responsive framework of laws with roles for each level of 
government would increase jurisdictional confidence and eliminate 
or mitigate uncertainty about risk.335 Federal regulation would also 
prevent hindrance of beneficial economic activity by ensuring that 
regulators and the public have access to accurate and adequate 
information and by providing necessary oversight and enforcement 
resources.336 Thus, allowing an active, yet adaptive, federal role in 
the regulation of activities that threaten to cause substantial harms 
will better protect public health and the environment as well as the 
virtues and values of federalism.337 
 
                                                          
334 See supra Parts II.C & III.B. 
335 See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
336 See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
337 See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
